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In 2007, an unprecedented event took place. Never before had the United
States Supreme Court pitted two civil rights victories against each other to
produce a high-profile defeat for advocates of school integration. Yet, this is
precisely what happened in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District' when the Justices struck down voluntary
desegregation plans in the public schools of Louisville, Kentucky and
Seattle, Washington. To reach this result, the Court ironically turned to
Brown v. Board of Education2 and Grutter v. Bollinger,3 both of which had
supported integration in education. In Brown, the Court famously declared in
a unanimous opinion that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. ' 4 Admittedly, in the years that followed, Brown's clout was
undermined by ceaseless battles over how its lofty rhetoric would be
implemented, even as its iconic status grew. Some saw the decision as
endorsing a normative ideal of colorblindness, while others insisted that
Brown recognized that race-consciousness was necessary to undo
longstanding patterns of segregation, subordination, and stratification. As
constitutional law scholar Reva Siegel has observed, Brown's legacy was far
from preordained, and "racial conflict has shaped the path and form of the
decision's canonization."5
By the time that Grutter came before the Court in 2003, there were
serious doubts about the future of race-conscious government decision-
making even when used to promote policies of access and integration. So,
when the Justices upheld the use of race in the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions process, activists hailed the decision as a much needed
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1 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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4 347 U.S. at 495.
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Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1477 (2004).
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shot in the arm for the civil rights movement. In short order, advocates
predicted that Grutter would provide the basis for upholding voluntary
school desegregation plans in public elementary and secondary schools. Yet,
far from being the sword that reinvigorated the integrationist ideal, Grutter
became the shield that blocked race-based. student assignment plans.
How did a case about diversity come to play a part in undoing voluntary
desegregation? This seemingly paradoxical result was born of a
jurisprudence of fragmentation that has manifested itself doctrinally in at
least three ways. First, Brown has been appropriated in the service of
competing agendas and so has become a decision at war with itself. The case
is invoked on all sides to support flatly contradictory interpretations of what
the Equal Protection Clause signifies. According to these warring accounts,
Brown alternatively means that strict colorblindness is the constitutional
norm or that flexible, color-conscious remedies are absolutely essential to do
racial justice.
Second, the school desegregation cases have proceeded on an entirely
different logic from higher education decisions that address affirmative
action in admissions. In implementing Brown, the Court focused on
rectifying past discrimination by school officials. Meanwhile, in public
colleges and universities, the Court recognized a diversity rationale that has
nothing to do with corrective justice and instead turns on the cosmopolitan
exchange of ideas among people with a range of backgrounds and
experiences. These two lines of authority have co-existed, unreconciled and
disconnected, until they collided in Parents Involved.
Third, cases involving race and equality have been highly
compartmentalized, so that the Court adopts different doctrinal strategies
depending on whether education, employment, government contracting, or
voting is involved. Again, these distinct approaches often seem to inhabit
parallel universes so that affirmative action can survive in colleges and
universities, even as it is struck down in government contracting. Or, race-
conscious remedies can persist in voting rights jurisprudence while they
come under siege in school desegregation cases.
6 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Court Affirms Use of Race in Admissions, L.A. TIMES,
June 24, 2003, at 1; Stephen Magagnini & Michael Doyle, Supreme Court Upholds Using
Race in School Entry, SAC. BEE, June 24, 2003; Greg Gordon & Mary Jane Smetanka,
Issues of Race and Access; Race Retains Limited Role in College Admissions, STAR
TRIBUNE, June 24, 2003, at IA.
7 Caroline Hendrie, In U.S. Schools, Race Still Counts; Despite Progress,
Challenges Loom, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 21, 2004, at 1, 18. Indeed, this strategy led to an
important early success in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1, 17 (lst Cir.
2005). John Gehring & Caroline Hendrie, Advocates Hail Ruling Backing Desegregation
Plan, EDUC. WEEK, July 13, 2005, at 3.
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As Parents Involved demonstrates, this fragmentation has led to
contradiction and confusion in our country's equal protection jurisprudence.
All of the Justices in the voluntary school desegregation cases claimed to be
the authentic interpreters of Brown's legacy, and there was open acrimony
over which of them was betraying the landmark decision. Amid this conflict,
the Court appeared incapable of charting a decisive course for social justice
in a racially complex world. Indeed, as I will show, the Justices were
hamstrung by a contestation between colorblind and color-conscious
interpretations of the Constitution that left little room for a dynamic and
flexible account of race. Despite the setbacks, Parents Involved offers an
important opportunity to reflect on how the Court can remain relevant by
acknowledging that equality is integrally linked to the freedom to forge
distinct identities in a diverse society.
I. WHEN EQUALITY CLAIMS COLLIDE: DESEGREGATION AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PARENTS INVOLVED
When the Court deliberated over whether to hear Parents Involved, the
parties framed the question for review as whether Grutter v. Bollinger could
be used to uphold the voluntary desegregation plans in Louisville and
Seattle.8 In Grutter, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion upheld
an admissions policy that weighed race as one factor in determining who
would be admitted to the University of Michigan Law School.9 Building on
Justice Lewis Powell's reasoning in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,' she found that diversity was a compelling interest and that
democratic legitimacy was advanced by broad access to pathways of
8 Petitioner's Brief at i, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908); Brief of Petitioner at i, Meredith v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915); Brief for Respondents at i,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No.
05-908); Brief for Respondents at 21, 24-27, 29-30, 36-44, 49, Meredith v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915). See also JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 325 (2008); David G.
Savage, Ever True to Brown? Two Public School Cases Raise the Legacy of the Famed
Desegregation Ruling, 92 A.B.A. J. 16, 17 (2006). Although the parties focused on
Grutter's implications, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund contended in its
amicus brief that strict scrutiny was inapposite because voluntary school integration was
not a form of affirmative action like that used in higher education admissions. Instead, a
rigorous rational basis scrutiny standard should apply to the Louisville and Seattle plans.
Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2-9, 19-23, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-915).
9 539 U.S. at 334.
10 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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leadership in elite public institutions." Although the majority opinion
permitted affirmative action to survive, O'Connor was careful to respect
Powell's caveat that programs had to be narrowly tailored to survive strict
scrutiny. The touchstone of narrow tailoring was a holistic review process
that treated all applicants as individuals with a range of backgrounds and
experiences. 12 Race could be one factor but it could not be used in heavy-
handed ways that raised the specter of a quota.13 O'Connor concluded that
the Michigan Law School's admissions system satisfied the standard, but
even then, she expressed a fervent hope that race-conscious affirmative
action would no longer be necessary in twenty-five years.
14
Although the Grutter decision was controversial for a number of
reasons, 5 school officials and their counsel in Louisville and Seattle
undoubtedly welcomed the ruling as a way to defend voluntary integration
plans. 6 School boards in both cities had adopted plans that gave some weight
to race in determining whether a student's application to enroll in a school
would be approved. Louisville put its voluntary plan in place when a federal
court declared the district unitary and mandatory busing therefore drew to a
close. Undoubtedly influenced by the Court's approach to desegregation, the
plan assigned students to a school within a specified geographic area, or
cluster, but rejected petitions to enroll that violated guidelines on the
proportion of blacks in the student body. 7
Seattle had not been subject to a desegregation order but had faced the
threat of litigation. In part to avert a lawsuit, the school district adopted a
series of voluntary plans. The one before the Court assigned ninth graders to
11 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-331.
12 Id. at 334.
13 Id. at 334-339; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 319-320.
14 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-343.
15 Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 224-235 (2006); Rachel F. Moran, The Heirs of
Brown: The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger, in RACE LAW STORIEs 451,490-495 (Rachel F.
Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
16 In fact, a federal court of appeals had relied on the diversity rationale to support a
voluntary integration plan shortly after Grutter was decided. See supra note 7. When the
Court granted certiorari in the Louisville and Seattle cases, speculation over Grutter's
implications continued. See David G. Savage, Cases Retread Brown v. Board of
Education Steps; The Supreme Court Takes Up Two School Integration Disputes that
Could Have Far-Reaching Effects, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A14 (describing Grutter
as the exception to the Court's tendency to strike down government policies that rely on
racial classifications).
17 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749 (with a district population that was 34%
black and 66% white, schools had to have a minimum of 15% black enrollment and a
maximum of 50% black enrollment).
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high schools based on their expressed preferences. 18 In the event that a
school was oversubscribed, race could operate as a tiebreaker as could
geographic proximity of the school to a student's residence or the presence of
a sibling in the school. 19 With a multiracial population of blacks, whites,
Asian Americans, and Latinos, Seattle measured the proportion of white to
non-white students in determining whether a school was diverse.20 Although
there were significant differences in the mechanics of the two plans, each
school district justified its program, at least in part, as a way to achieve
diversity in the student body. In doing so, both districts drew directly on the
rationale in Grutter.2'
Parents Involved easily could have become a referendum on Grutter, but
this is not in fact what happened. Indeed, none of the Justices framed the
litigation this way. In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts
deployed Grutter to eclipse Brown. This strategy seemed to suggest that
Grutter was a powerful precedent, but at the same time, Roberts' opinion
made clear that the diversity rationale had little force outside the realm of
higher education.22 So, Grutter became a shield that obscured Brown's
relevance but not a sword that would validate race-conscious policies outside
colleges and universities. Having limited Grutter to its facts, Roberts made
clear that, in general, the Constitution is colorblind and rejects government
use of racial classifications.23 According to Roberts, the Court allowed the
use of race-conscious remedies to cure a history of past discrimination, but
24
no such corrective justice rationale applied to these voluntary plans. In
Louisville, the vestiges of discrimination already had been eliminated root
and branch, and in Seattle, there had never been proof of past wrongdoing.
So, remediation was simply irrelevant to the resolution of the litigation and,
in effect, so was Brown. With neither diversity nor corrective justice
18 Id. at 2746-2747.
19 Id. at 2747.
20 Id. at 2746-2748 (with a 41% white and 59% non-white student body, schools
had to be within 10% of this overall level of racial balance). The first tiebreaker was
presence of a sibling, the second was race, and the third was geographic proximity. Id. at
2747.
21 Brief for Respondents at 24-30, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908); Brief for Respondents at 26-27,
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915).
22 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.
23 Id. at 2757-2759.
24 Id, at 2752.
25 Id. at 2761.
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available as justifications, the school systems had no basis for relying on race
in student assignments.26
Although these observations were fatal in their own right, the plurality
went on to note that the plans were not narrowly tailored to advance the
districts' stated rationales.27 In particular, each plan sought racial balance for
its own sake by enforcing rules of strict proportionality.28 These rules often
made no sense from the perspective of diversity, Roberts concluded. For
example, Seattle looked solely at the proportions of white and non-white
students, so the district would reject as insufficiently diverse schools with
enrollments that were twenty percent white, thirty percent Asian-American,
twenty-five percent Latino, and twenty-five percent black.29 Yet, this student
body certainly seemed diverse insofar as it created the conditions for a lively
exchange of ideas across a range of backgrounds and experiences.
30
Even in Louisville, which had a predominantly black and white
population, Roberts noted, Grutter would require that the district look at
factors other than race. He observed that Michigan had considered whether
students "have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several
languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have
exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful
careers in other fields.' Some of these criteria admittedly made little sense
in the context of elementary and secondary education. Even so, Roberts
faulted Louisville for its failure to supplement the focus on race with other
kinds of background and experience.32
For both political and legal reasons, the school districts had attempted to
minimize the burdens imposed on students under voluntary integration plans.
Rather than bolster the constitutionality of the assignment plans by
demonstrating that race was accorded only a marginal weight, the limited
impact became a basis for doubting the necessity of race-conscious
remedies.33 Roberts found that race played a negligible role in disposing of
the vast majority of transfer applications, especially in Seattle where it
operated as a tiebreaker. As a result, he concluded that race-neutral
26 Id.
27 Seattle relied on the need to reduce racial concentration in the schools and to
mitigate the impact of residential segregation on access to the most desirable schools,
while Louisville cited a desire for "a racially integrated environment." Id. at 2755
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
28 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757.
29 Id. at 2756.
30 Id. at 2756.
31 Id. at 2753 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 338).
3 2 Id.
33 Id. at 2760.
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alternatives were apt to be nearly as, if not just as, effective.34 Under Grutter,
Roberts contended, the districts had to employ race-neutral alternatives when
they were available, and here, neither had done so."
In Parents Involved, Justice Clarence Thomas was the most vocal critic
of race-conscious remedies. Rather than focusing on Grutter's implications,
his separate concurrence emphasized the ideal of a colorblind Constitution as
the essence of Brown's legacy. 36 Going even further, he condemned color-
conscious remedies like the voluntary integration plans as themselves tainted
by a segregationist legacy of racial subordination and stratification. 37 He
derided the boards' efforts as the product of sociological theories of race, the
very kind of approach that previously had laid the foundation for the Court's
approval of "separate but equal" policies in Plessy v. Ferguson.38 So Thomas
warned: "Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred
Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing
but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and
it is one the Constitution does not allow.
3 9
The Roberts plurality had accepted strict scrutiny as the standard of
review but rejected the relevance of diversity.40 By contrast, Justice Stephen
Breyer acknowledged diversity as a compelling interest in elementary and
secondary schools, but he ultimately found that strict scrutiny was
inappropriate because of the special history of school integration.4 In his
dissenting opinion, Grutter mainly was used to demonstrate that even if strict
scrutiny applied, it did not automatically invalidate race-conscious
programs. 42 For the Breyer dissent, an in-depth analysis of the diversity
rationale also proved largely beside the point, not because Grutter was a
higher education case but because Brown and its progeny were dispositive.
Breyer insisted that Brown's legacy not only compelled desegregation to
correct past injustices but also permitted voluntary plans to promote diversity
and prevent racial isolation.43 As support, he cited the Court's unanimous
decision upholding mandatory busing in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
34 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2782-2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 2776-2779 (Thomas, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 2788 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
40 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-2752, 2753-2754.
41 Id. at 2815, 2820-2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
42 Id. at 2816-2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 2811-2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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School Board.44 There, Chief Justice Warren Burger cited the need for
judicial deference to school board judgments about whether to implement
voluntary plans.45 In light of the persistence of racial segregation, the dissent
argued, the Court's decision to strike down the Seattle and Louisville
programs "threaten[ed] the promise of Brown.' '46
Breyer's choice of Swann was far from accidental. It was the last major
desegregation case in which the Court spoke with one voice. The unanimous
opinion was the product of tense negotiation and behind-the-scenes
compromise among the Justices, 47 but this fragile consensus fell apart in later
cases as the Justices descended into open bickering about Brown's
meaning.48 Although Roberts' plurality opinion took the dissent to task for
overlooking these subsequent decisions, 4 Breyer treated Swann as the last
opinion that truly honored Brown's legacy.5 ° In his view, the Louisville and
Seattle plans fell squarely within Swann's purview.5' Despite the Court's
recent jurisprudence applying strict scrutiny to all government racial
classifications, Breyer boldly argued that out of respect for Brown, the Court
should defer to school boards' assessments of how best to advance academic
achievement and racial tolerance through integration.
5 2
Justice Anthony Kennedy was left to split the difference. Kennedy
agreed with the plurality that strict scrutiny should apply whenever
individuals were subject to differential treatment on the basis of race. 3 Yet,
he was not convinced that school boards could consider race only when
remedying the vestiges of past discrimination. Instead, he agreed with the
dissent that nurturing diversity and preventing racial isolation were
44 Id. at 2811-2812 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Sch. Bd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
45 Swann, 402 U.S. at 16; see also N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45
(1971).
46 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 7 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 111-184 (1986).
48 See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 222-228, 245-246 (1979).
4 9 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2762.
50 See id. at 2812 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 2834 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2818-2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this, Breyer appeared to adopt the
position advocated by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in its amicus
brief. See Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., supra note 8,
at 9-14.
53 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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acceptable constitutional justifications for the Seattle and Louisville plans.54
Nonetheless, Kennedy found that the mechanics of the student assignment
programs were too crudely race-based to be acceptable. Instead of offering
examples of permissible plans akin to the one upheld in Grutter, Kennedy
indicated that he preferred race-conscious decisions that did not rely on the
differential treatment of individuals. For instance, officials instead could
promote integrated student bodies through the selection of school
construction sites or the drawing of attendance boundaries. 55
Ironically, then, a case that began as a referendum on Grutter ultimately
marginalized that decision. The plurality confined the diversity rationale to
higher education, but even the dissent concluded that the Parents Involved
litigation mainly implicated school desegregation precedents. As a result, the
cosmopolitan ideals of higher education could not save the Louisville and
Seattle plans, and the Justices were left to wage the battle for Brown's legacy
on other grounds. The fragmented opinions in Parents Involved were the
culmination of longstanding conflicts over the meaning of race and the nature
of equal protection. These disagreements were so profound that they had
converted Brown into a decision at war with itself.
II. BROWN'S LEGACY: A DECISION AT WAR WITH ITSELF
In Parents Involved, all of the Justices laid claim to Brown's legacy, in
part because of its iconic status in civil rights law.56 The sense that homage
must be paid, however, exhausted any consensus about the landmark
decision. Brown spawned a jurisprudence of fragmentation that culminated in
an acrimonious debate over the legitimacy of voluntary desegregation plans.
Although the fractured opinions in Parents Involved reflected competing
views of race, the Court largely omitted dynamic accounts based on the
autonomy to express a unique identity. As a result, the diversity rationale
offered little comfort to the Louisville and Seattle school districts
A. How the Battle Lines Were Drawn
At the outset, Brown seemed to have a clear objective: to strike down the
"separate but equal" doctrine that the Court had endorsed in Plessy v.
54 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
55 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
56 Id. at 2767-2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality); Idat 2768, 2783-2786 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Id. at 2797-2798, 2799-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 2800-2801, 2836-2837
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Ferguson57 in 1896. Plessy helped to entrench segregation by giving it the
patina of constitutionality and the semblance of equality. Only Justice John
Marshall Harlan dissented from the ruling, insisting that "[o]ur Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens., 58 For
him, blacks and whites had to be equal before the law, a formal right
conferred by national citizenship.59 This right was not necessarily a reflection
of actual equality of the races, as Harlan made clear when he remarked that
"[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage."60 Because Harlan saw racial differences as natural and inevitable,
he did not expect formally equal treatment to eliminate them. In short, his
principle of colorblindness was entirely consistent with racial stratification.
After Plessy legitimized a doctrine of "separate but equal" over Harlan's
dissent, civil rights advocates faced a stark legal landscape until events
surrounding World War II laid the foundation for renewed demands for racial
justice.6 ' The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) had been waging a long-term litigation campaign that, from the
late 1930s to 1950, resulted in key victories in lawsuits challenging the
exclusion of blacks from public institutions of higher education.62 The Court
struck down official practices that barred black applicants from admission
and redirected them to schools in neighboring states.63 The Court also found
that a separate public system of black colleges and universities could not
justify exclusion from white schools. 64 Finally, the Court concluded that once
admitted, blacks could not be segregated from whites in the library, the
57 163 U.S. 537, 551-552 (1896).
58 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59 Goodwin Liu, "History Will Be Heard": An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville
Decision, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 53, 55-56 (2008).
6 0 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Devon W. Carbado,
Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633, 647 (2005) (describing Harlan's distinction
between equality before the law and equality in fact).
61 For a description of how post-World War II developments affected the movement
for racial equality in the United States, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
War lmperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988).
6 2 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 251-255, 266, 323-357
(1975).
63 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 334-345 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-633 (1948).
64 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
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classroom, or the dining hall.65 In each instance, the Court cited either
tangible inequalities in facilities, personnel, or resources, or intangible
inequalities, for example, in access to reputational advantages and elite
alumni networks.
Brown did not come out of nowhere, but was clearly anchored in these
early victories in -higher education. Brown was special, though, because it
had the potential to touch the lives of many Americans who would never
attend a college or university. Although a few students enrolled in private
elementary and secondary schools for reasons of prestige or religion, the vast
majority went to public institutions. These "common schools" were places
where children from different backgrounds could come together to forge a
unifying and unique American identity.66
When Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that "'separate but equal' has no
place" in the public schools, his decision for a unanimous Court was
potentially breathtaking in scope.67 Warren condemned segregation, even if
tangible resources in black and white schools could be equalized. He cited
the intangible costs, particularly stigmatic injuries that damaged the "hearts
and minds" of black children "in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 68 In
light of the history of "separate but equal" laws and the description of
segregation's cruel effects, Brown appeared to take direct aim at conditions
of racial stratification and subordination. The Court seemed squarely focused
on the harm to victims that inhered in a system of racially identifiable public
schools.
Of course, Brown's potential to fight oppression depended not just on its
rhetoric but on its implementation. In Brown 11,69 the Court faced the
daunting task of fashioning remedies to cure the constitutional wrong of de
jure segregation. The Justices adopted a formula of "all deliberate speed"70
and left to the federal district courts the task of crafting plans on a case-by-
65 McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640, 642
(1950).
6 6 DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954,
at 195, 199-200 (1987); DAvID TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 270-272 (1974).
67 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
6 8 Id. at 494. In reaching this conclusion, Warren relied in part on psychological
research by Dr. Kenneth Clark, which found that regardless of their race, children
preferred white dolls to black dolls. Id. at 494 n. 11. This finding was deemed to be
evidence that black children had internalized a sense of inferiority due to segregation. Id.
at 494. The reliance on social science evidence became a highly controversial feature of
the Brown opinion. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-
158 (1955).
69 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
70 Id. at 301.
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case basis. Although there was far more deliberation than speed in the years
immediately following Brown, the Court affected a studied silence on the
adequacy of remedies for school segregation.7'
That passive stance changed when, in the wake of civil unrest, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.72 With congressional support and
agency enforcement, the Justices felt emboldened to speak to the propriety of
various remedies for state-mandated segregation. The Court rejected
"freedom of choice" plans that merely eliminated formal barriers to attending
integrated public schools. 73 According to the Justices, habits and prejudices
born of longstanding forced segregation tainted choices about where to go to
school and so perpetuated racial isolation.74 Later, the Court identified the
affirmative steps that schools had to take to rectify past discrimination. One
of the most controversial measures was busing, but the Justices unanimously
endorsed this remedy in the Swann case.7 5 Though increasingly conflicted
about the scope of desegregation plans, the Court preserved a unified front in
deference to Brown.76
As desegregation cases targeted the North and West, this fragile
unanimity shattered. Once challenges moved outside the South, with its
glaring history of slavery and Jim Crow, the Justices no longer felt compelled
to speak with one voice to uphold Brown's legacy. In Keyes v. School
District No. 1,77 a majority of the Court upheld a city-wide busing plan in
Denver, Colorado but only over vigorous dissent. Five Justices were willing
to join Justice William Brennan in inferring that segregative practices in one
neighborhood were presumptive evidence of discriminatory behavior
elsewhere in the school system and had the likely effect of distorting pupil
assignments throughout the district. 78 Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred
only in the result,79 Justice Lewis Powell filed a separate opinion that
rejected the de jure/de facto distinction,80 Justice William Rehnquist
dissented, 81 and Justice Byron White did not participate in the case.82
71 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004).
72 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1983, 2000a etseq.).
73 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-442 (1968).
74 Id.
75 Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Sch. Bd., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
76 SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 182-184.
77 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
78 1d. at 201-213.
79 Id. at 214 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result).
80 Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Powell adopted
this position in part because he did not believe that the South should be treated differently
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In Milliken v. Bradley,83 a divided Court struck down a mandatory busing
plan that enlisted white students in nearby suburban districts to desegregate
the heavily non-white school system in Detroit. The majority rejected
interdistrict plans unless suburban school boards had contributed in some
way to the history of intentional segregation that triggered a busing remedy
in the central city.84 Because Detroit's situation was typical of most
metropolitan areas, Milliken sounded the death knell for meaningful
integration in most cities outside the South.85 Even where desegregation
orders had been implemented, federal district courts began to withdraw from
oversight by declaring school districts free of any vestiges of past
discrimination. The Court endorsed these efforts in two decisions in the
1990s. 86 Again, the Justices were split with the majority receptive to the
possibility of terminating desegregation orders, and the minority worried
about the possibility of resegregation.
Brown became a decision at war with itself in part because of the strong
political resistance that federal courts faced when they ordered
desegregation, in particular, mandatory busing. If Brown I and II had left the
scope of the Court's remedial ambitions ambiguous, the ensuing backlash
against busing made some clarification and even constitutional revisionism
seem prudent and indeed imperative.88 Chief Justice Warren's opinion had
spoken of the devastating effects on children of forced racial separation. Yet,
as calls for integration moved North and West, the Justices increasingly
turned to the de facto/de jure distinction to limit the scope of unpopular
busing remedies. Judicial intervention was appropriate only to redress
from other parts of the country. JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 298-
300 (1994). He later retreated from this position as an improvident one, the product of
"Confederate emotions." Id. at 306 (internal quotations omitted).
81 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist took the position
that absent express segregation by law, there was no equal protection violation under
Brown, a classic anti-classification account of the Constitution. Id. at 254-258.
82 Id. at 214.
83 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Later, the Court relied on compensatory programs to cure
the history of discrimination in Detroit because desegregation was impossible without the
cooperation of white students in suburban school systems. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977).
84 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-752.
85 WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 223-226; Sheryll D. Cashin, American Public
Schools Fifty Years After Brown: A Separate and Unequal Reality, 47 How. L.J. 341,
346-347 (2004).
86 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
87 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489-490; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 251.
88 WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 227-230.
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intentional wrongdoing by public officials; federal judges were not
empowered to undo segregated patterns that resulted from private residential
choices.
In short, the government's invidious reliance on race, rather than the
harmful effects on children's "hearts and minds," came to dominate the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence. 89 To avoid any appearance of
inconsistency with Brown, the Court embraced Harlan's dissent in Plessy as
unequivocal authority for an anti-classification interpretation of equal
protection law. Critics have argued that Harlan's jurisprudential legacy is not
so clear-cut, noting that he was sometimes willing to allow the government to
rely on racial categories for purposes that were hardly benevolent. 90
Nonetheless, members of the Court not only distilled the principle of
colorblindness from the Plessy dissent but also assumed that Warren had
endorsed that reasoning in rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine. By
converting Warren into Harlan's acolyte, the Court was able to shift its gaze
from racial subordination to racial classification, all while professing
complete fidelity to Brown's integrationist legacy.91
The shift to an anti-classification Constitution meant that the Court was
more concerned with the propriety of official behavior than with the lived
experience of inequality and the costs exacted from the disadvantaged. Under
an interpretation of the type suggested by Justice Harlan in his Plessy dissent,
there was little solicitude for voluntary integration plans to counteract the
"private choices" and "demographic shifts"' 92 that yielded racially identifiable
neighborhoods and schools. Because no past official misconduct was at
issue, the Court could not justify the plans as cures for past discrimination.
Instead, the Justices would be endorsing the use of racial classifications they
had decried as insidious. The plans' approval would depend on weighing the
harms of segregation against the benefits of integration. Yet, this was
precisely the sort of empirical inquiry that had put the Court at the center of a
political maelstrom after Brown.93 Rather than become self-appointed racial
89 Siegel, supra note 5, at 1505-1513.
90 Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA
L. REv. 151, 157-158 (1996); Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind: John Marshall
Harlan's View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 973, 988-992 (1996).
91 Siegel, supra note 5, at 1515-1521.
92 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495; see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2761 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., plurality) (citing Freeman to make the distinction between de jure
segregation, for which remedies are necessary, and de facto segregation, for which they
are not).
93 Jack M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown: A Guide to the Opinions, in WHAT BROWN v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 44, 50-52 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001);
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 42 (2000).
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engineers, the anti-classificationists on the Court preferred to dismiss the use
of race out of hand.
For proponents of an anti-subordination Constitution, the Court was
obligated to do its utmost to root out stigmatizing segregation, regardless of
its causes.94 Even if the de jure/de facto distinction operated as a constraint
on judicial authority to order desegregation plans, the doctrine by no means
precluded voluntary plans. In fact, such efforts were essential because long
after Brown was decided, public school segregation persisted due to
pervasive residential segregation. 95  Experiments with race-neutral
alternatives like socioeconomic integration had generated only mixed success
in producing racially diverse schools. So, to achieve meaningful integration
at the elementary and secondary level, it was essential that the Court uphold
some race-conscious voluntary plans.9 6
With court-ordered desegregation drawing to a close, student assignment
plans could no longer be justified as purely remedial interventions. Instead,
school boards sought to defend the plans on pedagogical grounds. Here,
however, advocates of integration faced an important obstacle to preserving
Brown's legacy. The decision did not expressly recognize education as a
fundamental right under the Constitution, though some of the language
clearly seemed to support that interpretation.97 As Chief Justice Warren
observed, "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 98 In other
circumstances, the Court had recognized rights not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution because they were necessary to guarantee other fundamental
liberties. So, for example, the Justices implied a right to interstate travel to
94 Balkin, supra note 93, at 52-53; Catharine A. MacKinnon, MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in the judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION, supra note 93, at 145-147.
95 Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and
Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN
v. BOARD OFEDUCATION61-63 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).
96 Compare Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 1545, 1551-1557 (2007) (citing the success of socioeconomic integration plans in
producing racial diversity), with Cashin, supra note 85, at 359-360 (describing the "tide
of parental skepticism" that greets proposals for socioeconomic integration, thus limiting
their utility in advancing racial integration).
97 In the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a passage that
came close to recognizing education as a fundamental liberty under the Due Process
Clause was dropped to preserve unanimity, but "one could be forgiven for thinking that
the Court did hold that education was a fundamental interest in 1954, even if later courts
came to a contrary conclusion." Balkin, supra note 93, at 58 (emphasis in original).
98 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (1954).
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ensure access to the seat of national government.99 Assuming that public
education was integral to preparation for not just work but citizenship, the
Court might similarly infer a right of access to the instructional process.' 00
Efforts to reconstruct Brown as constitutional protection for a right to
learn were thwarted, however. At the same time that the Court was
developing its anti-classification approach to desegregation cases, the
Justices dashed any hope that the Constitution mandated equal educational
opportunity for all children. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,'' the plaintiffs argued that a local property tax system used to
finance the public schools was unconstitutional because it led to highly
unequal per capita student expenditures. The Court rejected this claim
because, among other things, education was a state and local responsibility,
and the federal Constitution did not mandate precise equivalence in
delivering these services (though the Justices indicated in dicta that there
might be some guarantee of minimum access). 102
After Rodriguez, integration could not be defended as a constitutionally
required educational strategy-a means of fulfilling the obligation to provide
equal opportunity in a common school. Under the Court's interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, there was no implied right to attend an
integrated school as a necessary component of preparing children for work
and citizenship in a diverse society. Shorn of a justification rooted in the
right to an education, the war over Brown's legacy was reduced to a dialectic
between an anti-classification and an anti-subordination Constitution.
B. How Race Became Reified
The war over Brown's legacy has reified race in ways that obscure
important aspects of this identity trait. Neil Gotanda identifies four different
ways that the Court conceptualizes race. 103 Proponents of an anti-
classification Constitution rely on formal-race, defined as a biological trait
that is presumptively irrelevant to government decision-making.
Colorblindness becomes the normative ideal because race is immaterial to
the official allocation of benefits and burdens. 1°4 Advocates of an anti-
subordination Constitution use historical-race, which focuses on "past and
99 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-632 (1969).
100 See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 707-708
(2004).
101 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
102 Id. at 23-25 & n.60, 37-44.





continuing [effects of] racial subordination."' 0 5 Historical-race underlies
government efforts to eradicate illicit stereotypes and institutional structures
like segregated schools that entrench inequality. 10 6  Desegregation
jurisprudence also makes room for status-race, which refers to "the
traditional notion of race as an indicator of social status." 107 Status-race
undergirds judicial efforts to eliminate intentional discrimination, including
de jure segregation, that perpetuates assumptions of racial inferiority.
What is obscured in the Court's analysis of school desegregation,
however, is culture-race, which Gotanda describes as a product of "broadly
shared beliefs and social practices" that generate a sense of "cultural
diversity."' 1 8 Race is no longer a biological irrelevancy that has to be
ignored, nor is race automatically a marker of inequality and prejudice that
must be erased through assimilative policies. On the contrary, so long as
practices and associations are freely chosen, race should be treated as a
material feature of everyday life that government must acknowledge and
respect. Officials are obligated to ensure tolerance and civility among groups
as they pursue their distinct cultural identities in a pluralistic society. 10 9
Culture-race engenders concerns about both freedom and equality. Here,
constitutional scholar Kenneth Karst's foundational work on equal liberties is
especially helpful. Karst contends that equal citizenship requires that
members of minority groups be permitted to exercise fundamental freedoms
on the same terms as other citizens."0 Among these freedoms would
certainly be a right to inculcate distinct cultural identities."' In analyzing
citizenship and the Constitution, Cristina Rodriguez has extended this
reasoning to language and participation by insisting on a "[f]luid civic
105 Id.
106 Id. at 47-48.
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 4-5.
109 Gotanda, supra note 103, at 67-68.
110 See generally, Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the
Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REv. 99, 102-113 (2007) (tracing the historical
development of equal liberties to protect racial minority groups under equal protection
and due process).
111 Kenneth L. Karst, The Bonds of American Nationhood, 21 CARDozo L. REV.
1141, 1172-1173 (2000) ("Government in America has no constitutional authority to
patrol the borders of a cultural group ... "); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 337 (1986) ("The most
important constitutional development of the twentieth century, the emergence of the
principle of equal citizenship, has promoted the freedom of individual choice about
cultural identification.").
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identity [that], at its core, disavows assimilation."" 2 In particular, she
contends that "participation in political and social life cannot require that the
participant repress or ignore meaningful cultural and linguistic
affiliations.""13 Like Karst, Rodriguez links equality to liberty in calling for
the autonomy to preserve one's heritage.
In the school context, a recognition of culture-race and the equal liberty
to preserve this heritage would require courts to focus on whether students
enjoy equal opportunities to develop their identities in a diverse classroom.
Race could no longer be treated as presumptively irrelevant, nor could judges
readily equate anti-subordination and assimilation. Had the Justices
recognized a fundamental right to education, school boards would have had a
legal vocabulary large enough to include culture-race in conceptualizing the
challenges presented by increasingly multiracial, multiethnic student bodies.
Given the Court's exclusive focus on rectifying past racial wrongs, however,
there was little room for this type of discourse in the school desegregation
cases.
During the 1970s, lawsuits in the West raised questions about the trade-
offs between busing and bilingual education. In San Francisco, parents
opposed a plan that would remove children from Chinatown and diminish
their access to programs that addressed Chinese-speaking students' special
linguistic and cultural needs. 1 4 In Denver, Latino parents raised a similar
objection to a busing plan that interfered with bilingual-bicultural
instruction. 15 In both instances, the Court rejected the demands to temper
court-ordered desegregation in deference to linguistic and cultural autonomy.
The Court already had disregarded the liberty claims of whites who
insisted that forced busing infringed on their freedom to associate with those
of their own choosing, that is, other whites. 16 These arguments were equated
with thinly veiled racism. In many ways, the Court subsumed the arguments
of Chinese and Latino parents within this debate. Race could be a mark of
wrongful discrimination and subordination, but not of an autonomously
112 Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 133, 145 (2001).
113 Id.
114 Rachel F. Moran, The Story of Lau v. Nichols: Breaking the Silence in
Chinatown, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 113, 115-116 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna
Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
115 Rachel F. Moran, Courts and the Construction of Racial and Ethnic Identity
Public Law Litigation in the Denver Schools, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 153, 159-160 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
116 For the classic account of court-ordered desegregation as an infringement on
associational rights, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1959).
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chosen set of cultural commitments. Chinese and Latino parents who thought
otherwise were characterized as victims of a false consciousness that aligned
them with white resistance when the Court already had concluded that, as
racial and ethnic minorities, their interests were aligned with those of blacks.
The Justices emphasized that Jim Crow had come to Chinatown and the
barrio, and so would desegregation." 7 In these cases, there was simply no
room for a form of culture-race that demanded the freedom to forge a unique
identity as well as an equal chance to participate in American society-at
least where there had been a history of intentional racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court was not alone in linking bilingual-bicultural
education to anti-busing sentiment. In 1974, the Nixon Administration
pressed for passage of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act."' The
measure offered alternatives to busing remedies, and one of these was
bilingual programs for students who spoke a language other than English." 9
The legislation had its roots in a powerful backlash against court-ordered
busing, a reaction typified by violent protests around the nation. 20 This
backlash lay at the heart of a long-running battle over busing in California, a
struggle waged at the ballot box as well as in state and federal court.
California's experience reveals how the neglect of culture-race could fuel
opposition to busing remedies.
In 1963, the California Supreme Court held that the state constitution
prohibited both de jure and de facto segregation in the public schools. 121 As a
result, nearly all of the Los Angeles school system potentially became
subject to court-ordered student transportation. 122 Widespread resistance
ensued, and advocates of "white rights" succeeded in enacting a 1972 ballot
measure that declared that: "No public school student shall, because of his
race, creed, or color, be assigned to or be required to attend a particular
117 Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215, 1216 (1971) ("Brown v. Board of
Education was not written for blacks alone. It rests on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, one of the first beneficiaries of which were the Chinese people
of San Francisco."); see also Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-198
(1973) (analogizing Hispanics to blacks in defining a segregated school).
118 Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (2000));
Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual
Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1271 (1988).
119 Moran, supra note 118, at 1271. See also Jonathan D. Haft, Assuring Equal
Educational Opportunity for Language-Minority Students: Bilingual Education and the
Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 18 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 209, 233-
234, 236 (1983).
120 For a description of some of the violence that arose outside the South in response
to school busing plans, see WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 202-215.
121 Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 382 P.2d 878, 881 (Cal. 1963).
122 Crawford v. Board of Education, 551 P.2d 28, 30-31, 45-48 (Cal. 1976).
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school. 123 Although 63% of the electorate supported the initiative, the
California Supreme Court struck it down because it unconstitutionally
prohibited schools from dismantling de jure segregation, as required by the
federal Constitution.
124
The next time around, busing foes adopted a different strategy. This time,
leaders enlisted the support of blacks and Latinos to rebuff any allegations of
racist motivation. One Latino politician in East Los Angeles circulated a
letter that warned: "Compulsory busing in most California cities would mean
the virtual end of bilingual education as we know it today."'125 Chicano
members of a community advisory committee appointed by the Los Angeles
school board also expressed doubts about "an integration policy that is totally
assimilationist in nature-one that does not respect the rights and needs of
the culturally different., 126 This time, opponents of busing successfully
enacted a provision that barred California courts from ordering remedies
unless they were independently required under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The measure was justified as a way to respect
all children's learning needs; indeed, the campaign's slogan was "We love all
kids.' ' 127 The measure not only won nearly 70% of the vote, but also survived
legal challenges in state and federal court.
128
In Crawford v. Board of Education,129 Justice Lewis Powell wrote for the
majority that upheld the California ballot measure. Powell noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be "destructive of a State's democratic
processes and of its ability to experiment."' 30 In concluding that the
democratic process in California had functioned appropriately, the Court was
clearly influenced by the multiracial nature of the state's population and its
broad support for the measure. Crawford found that the ballot measure was
race-neutral both on its face and in practice. As Powell observed,
123 Proposition 21, § 1 (Nov. 7, 1972) (cited in Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior
Court, 530 P.2d 605, 611 (Cal. 1975)).
124 Santa Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 613-615; Daniel Martinez-HoSang, The
Triumph of Racial Liberalism, the Demise of Racial Justice, in RACE AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 288, 292 (Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian Warren
eds., 2008).
125 Martinez-HoSang, supra note 124, at 297 (citing a letter from Alex Garcia,
California State Senator, to California State Senators (Nov. 30, 1977)).
12 6 Id. at 298 (citing CARLOS MANUEL HARO, MEXICANO/CHICANO CONCERNS AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN Los ANGELES 17 (1977)).
127 Id. at 303.
128 Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 532 n.5 (1982), affig, Crawford
v. Board of Education, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
129 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
130 Id. at 535.
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The benefit [the ballot measure] seeks to confer-neighborhood
schooling-is made available regardless of race in the discretion of school
boards. Indeed, even if [the measure] had a racially discriminatory effect, in
view of the demographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or
races would be affected the most or in what way. 131
Moreover, because the initiative "was approved by an overwhelming
majority of the electorate" and "received support from members of all
races," 32 Powell rejected any claim that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Under the circumstances, the Court was content to let the political
process run its course lest the judiciary "limit seriously the authority of States
to deal with the problems of our heterogeneous population."'
' 33
Ironically, Crawford recognized the dynamic tensions between
desegregation on the one hand and linguistic and cultural autonomy on the
other only to place these contested notions beyond the Justices' reach. By
deferring to the wishes of a multiracial, multiethnic electorate, the Court
treated fluid notions of identity, akin to what Gotanda would call culture-
race, as the province of private preferences and political strategizing. The
complexities of a dynamic approach to identity, expressed as a conflict
between the imperative of racial equality and the freedom to preserve a way
of life, simply fell outside the realm of judicial second-guessing.' 34 As a
result, the Court was able to protect its definition of race as either a formal
category or a mark of subordination. Even the lone dissenter in Crawford,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, focused on the demands of corrective justice to
rectify past discrimination. He reminded the Court of the long history of
resistance to court-ordered busing in California, and he asserted that, under
these circumstances, the initiative was an unconstitutional usurpation of state
judicial power to enforce a norm of equal protection. 35 His strong anti-
subordination perspective largely ignored the idea of culture-race.
131 Id. at 537.
132 Id. at 545.
133 Id. at 539.
134 Professor Ian Haney L6pez suggests that in adopting a diversity rationale for
affirmative action in higher education, Justice Powell relied on the image of "a nation of
minorities" in which groups stood on a relatively equal footing in competing for political
advantage. Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1063 (2007). Haney L6pez contends
that a laissez-faire attitude toward ethnic politics follows from this analysis and criticizes
the Court for intervening to invalidate minority set-asides that were the product of a
competitive political process in the city of Richmond, Virginia. Id. Haney L6pez does not
address Powell's opinion in Crawford, however. For more in-depth discussion of these
issues, see infra notes 247-260 and accompanying text.
135 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 548-551, 554-556 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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As this brief history makes clear, there has been little room in the Court's
jurisprudence to contemplate culture-race. The opinions in Parents Involved
all reflect this omission. Whatever their ideological predilections, the Justices
have paid little or no attention to dynamic and fluid conceptions of race. For
the plurality, an anti-classification Constitution meant that race is a biological
irrelevancy, and shifting social practices were beside the point as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. To rebuff the Louisville and Seattle school
districts' claims about culture-race and the socialization process, the plurality
dismissed a diversity rationale as wholly inapposite outside the realm of
higher education. For the dissent, the anti-subordination Constitution
controlled, so that schools could presume the benefits of integration as well
as the harms of racial isolation with limited judicial oversight. In Breyer's
opinion, historical-race and status-race were key, and the nod to diversity
paid lip service to culture-race without really engaging it. In fact, the dissent
treated the goal of eliminating racial isolation as largely fungible with
diversity, an approach that prompted the plurality to accuse the dissent of
seeking racial balance for its own sake.
136
Only Justice Kennedy occupied a niche that does not fit neatly into the
conventional struggle over Brown's meaning. Although persuaded by the
dissent that racial stratification persists, he was drawn to the plurality's anti-
classification norm when individuals directly experience differential
treatment on the basis of race. Kennedy previously had dissented in Grutter,
apparently unconvinced that the law school admissions policy avoided the
perils of a racial quota system. 137 So, perhaps it is unsurprising that he
rejected the mechanics of the assignment policies in Parents Involved,
particularly if the school districts engaged in judgments even less nuanced
than those in the Michigan case. 138 Yet, even if Kennedy deemed the
voluntary plans in Louisville and Seattle unworkable, he wanted public
schools to offer a space in which children from diverse backgrounds could
come together to build their identities and bridge their differences. Without a
well-developed account of culture-race in the desegregation jurisprudence,
however, Kennedy had difficulty finding a robust way to infuse this value
into his concurring opinion.
136 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2757-2759, 2763-2764 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality). For a lengthier discussion of
how all of the opinions in Parents Involved tended to conflate diversity and
desegregation, see Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School
Desegregation Cases, U. MIAMI L. REv. (forthcoming).
137 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
138 127 S. Ct. at 2793-2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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III. A DIFFERENT LOGIC: DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Parents Involved reveals how desegregation jurisprudence has diverged
from case law on affirmative action in higher education. To a significant
degree, the two areas, though both addressing race and integration, have
proceeded under entirely different logics. These distinct approaches are an
artifact of the interplay of the Court and the political process. Although the
Court took the lead in calling for public school desegregation, the executive
branch demanded affirmative action in colleges and universities. 39 Because
special admissions programs became pervasive without any findings of past
discrimination, they did not fit neatly into the dialectic between an anti-
classification and anti-subordination Constitution that dominated the battle
over Brown's legacy. When forced to confront the constitutionality of
affirmative action in admissions, the Court sidestepped this ongoing conflict
by making room for culture-race through a carefully circumscribed rubric of
diversity. In Parents Involved, this notion eventually collided with the reified
conceptions of race that have characterized the desegregation cases.
Ultimately, the Court found it difficult to make room for culture-race in
elementary and secondary school classrooms.
A. From Colorblindness to Diversity: The Evolution of Racial Equality
in Higher Education Cases
In higher education, the Court's approach to racial equality has evolved
from colorblindness to diversity. Initially, the Court embraced a formal
approach to race in college and university admissions. In the years before
Brown, the Court dismantled "separate but equal" policies but did not
mandate any special steps to ensure access for black applicants.' 40 Instead,
the Justices held that if applicants met the relevant standard, they had to be
admitted regardless of race.' 4' This anti-classification strategy allowed black
and white applicants "freedom of choice" in higher education. 42 Although
this type of approach eventually was deemed inadequate to cure past
discrimination in elementary and secondary schools, the Justices showed no
interest in addressing the strategy's limits when integrating colleges and
139 Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
607, 612-620 (1998).
140 See Moran, The Heirs of Brown: The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger, supra note
15, at 452-453.
141 Id. at 453.
142 Id. at 452-453.
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universities. 143 Predictably, without much in the way of outreach or support,
black enrollments in white institutions of higher education remained low.' 44
There was not a similar complacency on the political front. President
Lyndon Johnson, fresh from a landslide victory over Senator Barry
Goldwater in 1964, moved decisively to consolidate his vision of the Great
Society. 145 Part of that vision included the full incorporation of blacks into
American life.146 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered the Court to begin
vigorous enforcement of Brown.147 But Johnson also was concerned about
ongoing segregation in other sectors, including higher education. In 1965, he
announced at Howard University that:
[F]reedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by
saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and
choose the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say,
"you are free to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you
have been completely fair. 148
To overcome a history of racial exclusion, Johnson promoted policies of
affirmative action by executive order. 49 Although still firmly anchored in a
rhetoric of remediation, Johnson's approach permitted race-conscious
measures without any judicial finding of past discrimination. In the wake of
civil unrest, nearly all colleges and universities responded to Johnson's
invitation by adopting race-conscious admissions programs. 150
Johnson's successor, President Richard M. Nixon, built on race-
conscious initiatives during the early years of his administration. Shortly
143 See id
14 4 See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 382-383 (2005).
14 5 See ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES, 1961-
1973 at 189-195 (1998).
146 Id. at 211.
147 WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 78, 102-108.
148 Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: "To Fulfill
These Rights" (June 4, 1965), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 636 (1966).
149 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2000).
150 See KARABEL, supra note 144, at 384-392.
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after his election in 1968, Nixon signed the Voting Rights Act of 197015 tand
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.152 In addition, he
established set-asides for minority business enterprises seeking federal
contracts.153 Even so, Nixon soon saw the political advantage in condemning
both busing and affirmative action as part of an appeal to America's "silent
majority. ' 154 By the early 1970s, with four Nixon appointees on the Court,
the retreat from busing and the rise of an anti-classification interpretation of
Brown were underway.' 
55
Given these developments, another question loomed: What would
become of affirmative action in the face of growing protests from a not so
silent majority? In higher education, the important test case was Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke. 156 There, a disappointed white
applicant, Allan Bakke, challenged the admissions practices at the University
of California at Davis medical school. 157 He alleged that the school's practice
of setting aside seats for underrepresented minorities was a form of "reverse
discrimination" that violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Protection Clause.' 58 In effect, Bakke was calling on the Court to reject
the executive branch's efforts to inject anti-subordination practices into
higher education. If the Court acceded, it would revert to the pre-Brown
doctrine in college admissions cases, making clear that race-conscious
remedies were reserved for rectifying past institutional discrimination and
that the Constitution was otherwise colorblind.
The Bakke case split the Court four-to-four with Powell, a Nixon
appointee, as the crucial swing vote. 159 Four Justices wanted to strike down
Davis's plan on the ground that Title VI's non-discrimination provision
151 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, amended by Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa (2000)).
152 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
153 PHILIP A. KL1NKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 293-294 (1999).
15 4 See ROBERT MASON, RICHARD NiXON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAJORITY 53-
54, 104 (2004); KLINKNER wITH SMITH, supra note 153, at 293-296.
155 Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His
Law-and-Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REv. 323, 331
(2006) (describing Rehnquist as "Nixon's fourth and final Supreme Court appointment"
in 1971).
156 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
157 Id. at 277-278.
158 Id.
159 JEFFRIES, supra note 80, at 231, 490.
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assumed that the Constitution adopted a colorblind standard and thus
prohibited reverse discrimination. 160 The call for an anti-classification
approach would come at a significant price, however, by disrupting well-
established programs of affirmative action necessary to integrate colleges and
universities.16' Another four Justices wanted to uphold the Davis plan
because race was being used to promote rather than bar minority access.
They believed that benign government programs should not trigger strict
scrutiny, but rather a more deferential intermediate standard of review. Under
this standard, programs need only be substantially related to an important
state interest to satisfy the Constitution. Because Davis's goals of remedying
past societal discrimination and diversifying the medical school and the
profession counted as important and because the set-aside plan substantially
advanced these goals, the program passed muster. 162
With his colleagues equally divided, Justice Powell stepped into the
breach. He sought a way out of the paralyzing debate over whether to adopt
an anti-classification or an anti-subordination approach in analyzing Davis's
program. Although Powell agreed that racial classifications were inherently
suspect and therefore triggered the most searching level of judicial scrutiny,
he did not totally disallow their voluntary use by government officials as a
strict anti-classification view would require. 63 Nor did he permit Davis to
justify its program by invoking general societal discrimination or
underrepresentation in the profession, both of which reflected an anti-
subordination perspective. 64 Instead, Powell turned to the First Amendment
and the tradition of academic freedom to recognize a pedagogical rationale
for voluntary affirmative action, the very kind of justification that Rodriguez
had stymied in the elementary and secondary school setting. 165 According to
Powell, diversity was a compelling interest because it promoted the free
exchange of ideas by nurturing an "atmosphere which is most conducive to
160 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413-417 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Although these Justices relied on Title VI as the narrowest ground for
decision, their claim that the statute was co-extensive with the Constitution signaled that
colorblindness was a requirement under equal protection law, too. BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 56-62, 109-118 (1988);
see also JOEL DREYFUSS AND CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF
INEQUALITY 214-216 (1979) (noting that the Title VI analysis was one "indication" of
how the Justices would decide the equal protection issue but was designed to avoid
"divulging their views on the ultimate question").
161 WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 302.
162 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting).
163 Id. at 291, 305 (Powell, J.).
164Id. at 310-311.
165 Id. at 311-315.
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speculation, experiment and creation."' 166 Race was one of many traits that
enabled colleges and universities to identify students who could draw on
their backgrounds and experiences to contribute to this dialogue.1
67
Although Powell had deflected the dialectic between an anti-
classification and anti-subordination Constitution, he remained deeply
concerned about overreliance on race in any facet of government decision-
making. As a result, he struck down Davis's plan because it set aside spaces
for members of racial and ethnic minority groups, a quota system that in
effect precluded whites from competing for a prescribed number of seats in
the entering class. 168 To provide guidance to higher education administrators,
Powell offered an example of a plan that would pass constitutional muster.
Harvard's undergraduate admissions program looked at individuals in a
holistic way that took into account a range of characteristics and gave special
weight not just to race but also to geographic origin, musical talent,
socioeconomic disadvantage, and unique personal experience, among
others. 169 This approach at no point precluded applicants from competing for
all of the spots in the entering class. 170 Justice Powell was comfortable that
Harvard's plan would permit colleges and universities to continue using
affirmative action but in a narrowly tailored way that treated each applicant
as an individual.1
71
By the 1990s, however, the backlash against affirmative action had
intensified, and Bakke seemed ripe for challenge. Critics of Powell's
reasoning enjoyed an unprecedented success in 1995 in Hopwood v. Texas. 72
Cheryl Hopwood, a white working-class woman denied admission to the
166 Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). The
conceptual implications of diversity remain a lively topic of debate among academics.
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 1149, 1153-1164 (2003) (offering competing notions of what diversity means
and what purposes it serves).
167 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-313.
168 Id. at 315-316. A number of commentators have questioned whether there is any
meaningful distinction between quotas and holistic review that attaches some weight to
race. Indeed, even at the time Bakke was decided, Powell's clerks harbored serious
reservations about the defensibility of the distinction. JEFFRIES, supra note 80, at 476-
478,484-485.
169 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-318, 321-324.
170 Id. at 318.
171 Id. at 318. See also JEFFRIES, supra note 80, at 484-485 (describing how
"Powell's canny instinct for public perception told him that he had much to gain by
celebrating the Harvard approach").
172 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), remanded to, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929
(2001).
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University of Texas Law School, alleged wrongful discrimination on account
of her race. According to Hopwood, there were substantial disparities
between the grades and Law School Admissions Test scores required of
white applicants like her and those required of black and Mexican-American
applicants. 73 Hopwood asserted that race pervaded the law school's
admissions process with files going through separate review processes and
students placed on segregated waiting lists. 74 She argued that because race
was given so much weight, Texas, in effect, had implemented quotas rather
than the kind of holistic, individualized review that Justice Powell
envisioned.
175
The district court found that the law school could consider race in
admitting students, but that its program was not narrowly tailored because it
relied on a segregated and stratified process. 176 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court but went much further by condemning the
diversity rationale in Bakke as illegitimate. Noting that Justice Powell wrote
only for himself, the court of appeals concluded that "the classification of
persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than
facilitates, the goals of equal protection.' ' 177 Even though the Fifth Circuit's
call for an anti-classification Constitution was a direct rebuke to Powell's
reasoning, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in the case, perhaps
because the highly racialized particulars of the Texas admissions process
made it a less than appealing forum in which to address the legitimacy of
affirmative action.
178
Instead, the Court heard challenges to admissions practices at the
University of Michigan.179 In Grutter, both the plaintiffs and the Michigan
law school defendants were content to frame the claims as a referendum on
Bakke. The plaintiffs wanted the Court to embrace an anti-classification
approach as the Fifth Circuit had done in Hopwood, while Michigan wanted
173 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936-937.
174 Id. at 937-938.
175 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 553 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd by 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996).
176 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578-579.
177 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
178 Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1996). The brief concurring opinion
by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in which Justice David Souter joined, suggested
significant discomfort with the mechanics of the Texas admissions policy, which no party
to the case appeared to defend on appeal. Id.




to preserve the constitutional legitimacy of Powell's diversity rationale.1
80
Only a group of student-intervenors rejected this framework as an evasion
that itself was a betrayal of Brown's legacy. They believed that the challenge
to affirmative action presented "a choice between two traditions in American
life and law: the tradition of Plessy v. Ferguson and the tradition of Brown v.
Board of Education."''81 The student-intervenors impugned the call for an
anti-classification Constitution as a "perverse, indeed racist, view of
equality" that reverted to Plessy's vision of a "separate but equal" society.
182
They also took the law school to task for condoning a diversity rationale that
did little to address structural inequality and institutional racism. 183 The
student-intervenors wanted the Court to revitalize Brown and thus revive
"[t]he tradition of mass mobilization and progressive legal action" in the
struggle against racial subordination.'"
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor did not take up the student-intervenors'
invitation to treat the Michigan litigation as an indictment of racial injustice
in America. Instead, she treated Grutter as an opportunity to revisit Bakke,
and she adopted Justice Powell's approach by choosing the middle way.
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter refused to endorse a pure anti-classification
Constitution, even if racial classifications remained suspect and so triggered
the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Yet, she also sidestepped the dangerous
political terrain historically associated with an anti-subordination principle
by limiting the justifications for affirmative action in admissions to
promoting diversity and democratically legitimate leadership. 8 5 Though
carefully circumscribed, O'Connor's opinion sat uneasily with the school
desegregation cases, which increasingly rejected race-conscious measures
except as a remedy for state-sponsored discrimination. Admittedly, the Court
had not yet rejected voluntary desegregation plans when Grutter was
decided, so the law was at least technically consistent. But even that
semblance of consistency would be sorely tested by the decision in Parents
Involved.
180 Moran, The Heirs of Brown: The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger, supra note 15, at
461.
181 Defendant-Intervenor's Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928),
available at 2000 WL 35575808.
182 Id. at 24-25.
183 Id. at 6-8, 26-27, 28-35, 38.
184 Id. at 13.
185 Moran, The Heirs of Brown: The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger, supra note 15, at
478-480, 481-485.
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B. The Contestation over Culture-Race and the Colliding Logics of
Diversity and Desegregation
The distinct logics of diversity and desegregation collided in Parents
Involved. This collision in turn reflected the uneasy relationship between race
and ethnicity in the Court's jurisprudence on race. These tensions have
augured the possibility of culture-race but also have made it difficult for the
Justices to elaborate a consistent theory of the concept. Consider, for
example, Professor Ian Haney L6pez's critique of Powell's opinion in Bakke.
Haney L6pez has argued that Brown was about race, while the diversity
rationale was not. Reflecting the way in which the recognition of culture-race
often devolves into a clash between race and ethnicity, Haney L6pez insists
that Powell invoked the image of a "nation of minorities" in Bakke so that he
could substitute a particular conception of ethnicity for race. As a result, his
opinion equated the histories and experiences of a range of groups, including
blacks, European immigrants, Japanese Americans, and Mexican
Americans.1
86
According to Haney L6pez, Powell's turn to ethnicity treated groups as
standing on an equal footing in the political process. If this were true, Haney
L6pez contends, Powell should have rejected strict scrutiny as no longer
necessary to police abuses of minorities. Because he was unwilling to
embrace an intermediate standard of review, however, Haney L6pez argues
that Powell added a gloss to his account of ethnicity. In particular, he "relied
on a specific version of ethnicity theory, one that depicted racial
subordination as over while simultaneously presenting whites as vulnerable
minorities."'
87
Haney L6pez takes a dim view of Powell's reliance on this theory of
ethnicity, arguing that the diversity rationale betrayed Brown's legacy by
laying the groundwork for "reactionary colorblindness.' 88 Far from leading
to a flexible approach to questions of discrimination and inequality, Haney
L6pez asserts, Bakke's account of a "nation of minorities" necessarily
converged with formal-race because "these notions work hand in hand to
produce a racial ideology capable of claiming that racism is a thing of the
past, that group inequality reflects cultural capacity, and that whites are
vulnerable minorities.' ' 189 For Haney L6pez, Brown embraced an anti-
subordination Constitution that treats race as "a socially and legally produced
hierarchical system structurally embedded in U.S. society.' 19° To the extent
186 Haney L6pez, supra note 134, at 1035-1036.
18Id. at 1043.
188 Id. at 990, 1034, 1043.
189Id. at 1029.
190 Id. at 990.
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that Bakke (and later Grutter) diverged from this view, the cases already had
defeated Brown; the Parents Involved decision just made it official.
Although the higher education cases clearly do adopt a distinct logic
from the school desegregation decisions, Haney L6pez's provocative account
of Justice Powell's turn to ethnicity in Bakke must be tempered by several
observations. For one thing, Powell himself probably would not have
described his thinking in this way. He reportedly was torn between his
distaste for permanent programs of affirmative action and his belief that it
was "too late in the day" to outlaw them. Indeed, Powell feared that any
effort to do so would be "a disaster for the country"'191 and ordered his law
clerk to "find a middle ground.' 92 The diversity rationale appealed to Justice
Powell because it avoided the harshness of invalidating affirmative action
under a strict anti-classification approach, while it averted the difficulties of
measuring comparative disadvantage to determine which groups deserved
compensation under an anti-subordination approach. 193 Powell was
convinced that his middle way would allow college and university
administrators to focus on problems of underrepresentation without
permanently institutionalizing quota systems. 194
Even if a non-white identity was treated as one trait among many, it is
unlikely that a long-time Virginian like Powell considered it truly on a par
with white ethnicity. On the contrary, his biographer John C. Jefflies, Jr.
writes that:
For Powell, as for many white southerners, the progression from Brown to
Bakke brought a revolution in announced conviction, an about-face in
articulated belief. Yet remnants of old attitudes survived. Justice Powell still
had a gentleman's sense of responsibility for the less fortunate and a
southerner's instinct for paternalism toward blacks. No southerner could
readily deny that blacks needed help, as the excesses of the past and the
region were too familiar to ignore. The upper-class sense of noblesse oblige
and the southerner's assumption of white control and responsibility
conspired to the same conclusion: Racial justice required racial
preference. 195
In short, under Jeffries' account, Powell may have been influenced as much
by his sense of southern obligation as by any emerging theory of a "nation of
minorities." Indeed, this underlying ambivalence about race could explain
why his vision of ethnicity in Bakke was incompletely realized.
191 JEFFRIES, supra note 80, at 469.
192 Id. at 473.
193 Id. at 475.
194 Id. at 475-476.
195 Id. at 470--A71.
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Of course, it is entirely possible that whatever Powell's private
intentions, his analysis in Bakke ultimately had the impact that Haney L6pez
describes. If so, it is surprising that advocates of colorblindness in Hopwood
and Grutter went to considerable lengths to discredit the diversity rationale
by characterizing it as nothing but Powell's "lonely" opinion. In fact, the
very idea that racial identity is malleable, contingent, and thus germane to the
exchange of ideas necessarily undermines the view that race is ascribed,
fixed, and irrelevant. So, it should come as no surprise that formalists who
advocate colorblindness also studiously eschew any consideration of the
sociology of race and ethnicity in contemporary America. For them, a
dynamic vision of culture-race is simply out of bounds as a constitutional
matter.
Among the most notable proponents of a formalist approach to race are
the Justices who joined Roberts' plurality opinion in Parents Involved. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are relatively new to the Court, but
both Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have written about their
commitment to formalism and an anti-classification Constitution. 96 Scalia
has argued that judges normally must abide by a common-sense reading of
textual provisions.197 To consider demographics and social context is to
invest judges with substantial discretion to make law as they go along.'98
According to Scalia, judge-made law subverts the democratic process
because the clear meaning of a text, whether constitutional or statutory, can
be revised on a case-by-case basis. 199 He concludes that "attacking the
enterprise [of interpretation] with the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-
196 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and the Law, in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23-
25, 38-47 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.REv.
1175, 1177-1180 (1989); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1996);
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 581, 594-596 (1990); Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the
Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30
How. L.J. 691, 700-703 (1987).
197 Scalia has made clear that he would sometimes deviate from this approach when
the results would otherwise be intolerable. So, even if the notion of cruel and unusual
punishment did not extend to public flogging at the time the Eighth Amendment was
adopted, Scalia would declare such a sanction unconstitutional today. For that reason, he
describes himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. ON. L. REV. 849, 861-862, 864 (1989).
198 Id. at 862-863; Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 196, at
1177-1180.
199 SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra
note 196, at 10-11, 13 (1997).
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law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation. ''2°° Yet, it is
precisely this sensitivity to context that is essential to an understanding of
culture-race. Because diversity draws on this concept, context is critical to
both Powell's opinion in Bakke and O'Connor's opinion in Grutter.
These context-specific decisions are anathema to Scalia. In his view,
"The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any other
provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the discretion-conferring
approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice
very well." 201 Instead, clear neutral principles can be gleaned from a
common-sense reading of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself: "No
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. 20 2 At no point does this language distinguish among individuals
on the basis of race; for Scalia, the language is race-neutral and this alone is
decisive.203 Given his distaste for textual embellishments, it is hard to see
him being influenced by any theory of ethnicity espoused by Justice Powell
in Bakke and affirmed by Justice O'Connor in Grutter. Instead, for Scalia,
affirmative action is discrimination pure and simple because the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment says so.
2 °4
Justice Clarence Thomas has embraced originalism since his arrival on
the Supreme Court.20 5 Thomas wants to be true to the drafters' original
intent, so in addition to the text, he examines evidence regarding legislative
history to interpret a provision's meaning. He grounds this inquiry in a
regime of natural law rights, which he believes is embedded in the form of
government created by the Founders.2 °6 Although his reasoning is different
from Scalia's in some respects, Thomas also concludes that the Constitution
is colorblind and condemns the official use of racial classifications.2 7 Far
2 00 Id. at 14.
201 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 196, at 1178.
202 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
203 See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or Iish who
were discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women, 'created equal,'
who were discriminated against.").
204 Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as the Cure: "In Order to Get beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 148 (1979)
(describing Powell's diversity rationale as "an historic trivialization of the Constitution"
because of the flimsy pretense used to "overcome the presumption against discrimination
by race").
205 ANDREw PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 474 (2001).
206 SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 103-104 (1999).
207 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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from embracing any sociological theory of ethnicity to bolster his views,
Thomas has openly criticized Brown for relying on social science evidence to
document black inferiority and condone racial paternalism. 2 8 Again, he
seems unlikely to be swayed by any theory of ethnicity proposed in Bakke
and elaborated in Grutter.
Finally, despite Haney L6pez's indictment of the insidious impact of
Powell's theory of "a nation of minorities," ethnicity is not apt to be a stable
and monolithic concept any more than race is in the Court's jurisprudence.
Just as anti-classification and anti-subordination rationales have splintered
race into versions that are formal, status-based, and historical, the
contestation over culture-race, expressed as tensions between race and
ethnicity in equal protection law, is likely to destabilize both concepts. In
fact, multiple notions of ethnicity have haunted equal protection law just as
various definitions of race have.
Historian David Gutierrez has observed that ethnicity has at least two
meanings: one that involves "primordial, immutable, preconscious aspects of
a group's social identity (or sense of peoplehood)" and one that consists of
"mere[] strategies for pursuing group interests in society and comprises,
therefore, situational, circumstantial, or optional components of individual
and group identity., 20 9 Haney L6pez worries that because Powell defined
ethnicity as something other than peoplehood, the concept subverted race and
led inevitably to "reactionary colorblindness." When ethnicity is treated as a
form of primordial peoplehood, it takes on the ascribed, fixed qualities
associated with images of race that have dominated the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence. As a consequence, ethnicity is subsumed within the
debate over an anti-classification or anti-subordination Constitution.1 0 For
example, when Chinese and Latino parents challenged court-ordered busing,
the Court found that they were victims of past discrimination and so must
benefit from desegregation remedies, whether or not they wanted the cure. In
these cases, the Court treated ethnicity as a race-like form of peoplehood and
208 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-123 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
GERBER, supra note 206, at 79.
2 0 9 DAVID G. GuTERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 7 (1995). I do not mean to suggest that
Gutierrez's dichotomy is exhaustive of the ways that the courts have used the term
"ethnicity," but the distinction is a valuable starting point. Indeed, it would be quite
useful to create a comprehensive taxonomy of ethnicity comparable to Gotanda's
taxonomy of race. See Gotanda, supra note 103, at 4.
210 See Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1294-1296




so dismissed any notion that it could reflect a dynamic set of strategic
interventions to maximize group interest.
21 1
When ethnicity becomes strategic and dynamic, however, it collides with
reified notions of race in ways that expose the limits of the debate over the
anti-classification and anti-subordination Constitution. With respect to an
anti-classification approach, the recognition of ethnicity undercuts biological
accounts of race by allowing room for the possibility of culture-race. If, in
fact, race like ethnicity reflects socially contingent practices, formalism is no
longer equivalent to neutrality. In the area of language, for example, official
English mandates clearly disadvantage racial and ethnic groups that speak
other tongues. The government may justify these mandates in the name of
nation-building or economic mobility, but whatever the rationale, these
policies are by no means neutral in allocating burdens and benefits among
groups that command very different linguistic resources. 2 This observation
in turn casts doubt on the assertion that colorblindness operates as a neutral
principle if groups similarly find themselves arrayed along a racial hierarchy
with very different histories, traditions, and resources.213
As for anti-subordination, an acknowledgment of ethnicity demonstrates
the limits of equating assimilation with full inclusion.214 Justice Scalia once
remarked that "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American.', 21 5 In doing so, he captured the notion that there is a single,
homogenous national identity that each individual must master. Yet, Walt
Whitman's image of America as a "nation of many nations" suggests a
different model, one in which distinct cultural practices, often associated
with race and ethnicity, persist and even flourish.216 Under this view, to the
extent that members of racial and ethnic groups must sacrifice their language
and culture to participate meaningfully in American life, they are neither
truly free nor entirely equal.217
211 See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
212 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 115 (1995).
213 See Vilna Bashi, Racial Categories Matter Because Racial Hierarchies Matter:
A Commentary, 21 ETHNIC & RAC. STUD. 959, 963, 965 (1998) (observing that "[riacial
categories tell us about racial hierarchies" and that racialization "comes down to a
question of power").
214 See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2008 (2000); Rodriguez, supra note 112, at
145-149.
215 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
216 Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 40 (M. Cowley ed., 1959).
217 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
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With only a limited place for culture-race in the Court's jurisprudence,
there have been few ways to talk about how race and ethnicity can be
voluntary and involuntary at the same time. A subordinated status is
unchosen, and it can impede the realization of a professed national ideal,
whether it be colorblindness or respect for diversity. 218 This gap between the
ideal and the real in turn can be grist for the development of the social
practices and attitudes that comprise culture-race. 21 9 As groups deploy
strategies to alter their circumstances, members' racial and ethnic self-
presentation will shift to reflect new challenges and opportunities. 220 Despite
the fluidity of identity, there are some enduring lessons about the
complexities of culture-race: Race is neither static nor irrelevant, nor is it a
feature of American life that can be eradicated. So long as the real falls short
of the ideal, everyone will belong to America in different ways. The
government can not assume the stance of a disinterested bystander in the
quest to live up to collective aspirations, nor will -the marginalized passively
await their moment of uplift and redemption. In the end, government's task is
to ensure a level playing field through norms of mutual respect as diverse
groups pursue these evolving conceptions of culture-race.
221
Whatever the shortcomings of the diversity rationale as an elaboration of
the concept of culture-race, the Justices at least have engaged this idea in
higher education decisions. By contrast, before Bakke was decided, the Court
had consigned culture-race to irrelevancy in its elementary and secondary
school cases. In Lau v. Nichols, for instance, the Court relied on an
interpretation of Title VI that recognized Chinese-speaking students' claims
only because the San Francisco school district had used language as a proxy
to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.222 This
analysis did not acknowledge how language could play an affirmative role in
constituting a child's identity. In fact, this line of argument previously had
been dismissed when the Court refused to exempt Chinese students from a
busing decree based on a desire to preserve their linguistic heritage.223 In
218 Larry L. Naylor, Culture and Cultural Groupings, in CULTuRAL DIVERSITY IN
THE UNITED STATES 12-14 (Larry L. Naylor ed., 1997).
219 See, e.g., GUTIERREz, supra note 209, at 7-8 (describing how Mexican-
Americans shifted from a primordial identity to situational ethnicity in response to
discrimination in the United States).
220 Angela P. Harris, Foreword. The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 741, 770 (1994); John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire
Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 2129, 2160 (1992).
221 Gotanda, supra note 103, at 66-67.
222 414 U.S. 563, 563 (1974).
223 Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215, 1215 (1971). For a fuller discussion of these
issues, see Rachel F. Moran, A New Twist on "The One Best System ": Structured
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both cases, the Justices treated ethnicity as fungible with race; each was an
ascribed characteristic relevant only when it became the basis for
discrimination.
Lau was decided one year after Rodriguez, and the Rodriguez Court's
rejection of any fundamental right to education effectively foreclosed claims
that the district was obligated to accommodate language differences so that
Chinese-speaking students could prepare themselves to participate in the
workforce and in civic life.224 As a consequence, language and culture could
not be linked to norms of belonging and respect for difference that had to be
incorporated into the classroom as a microcosm of a pluralistic society.
Strategic choices about linguistic and cultural identity would be grist for the
local political process, but only transgressions against a primordial
peoplehood would count in court. Despite the tremendous significance of the
public schools in socializing children, a role recognized in Brown, the Court
left no room for culture-race in its desegregation jurisprudence.
Even if Powell's particular theory of ethnicity in Bakke is a limited one,
his intuition that freedom is as much at stake as equality in achieving racial
justice is an important one. 225 The unlinking of freedom and equality in
school desegregation cases has led to a regrettably effete discourse about
race. In Parents Involved, for example, although the Louisville and Seattle
school districts invoked diversity, they did not fully embrace the rich
complexity of culture-race. Because the districts appropriated the rhetoric of
diversity without fully engaging its complexity, the plurality expressed
bewilderment at the plans' definitions of success:
Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion of
diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/non-white terms in Seattle and
black/"other" in Jefferson County.... [U]nder the Seattle plan, a school
with 50 percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but
Immersion Initiatives, Equal Opportunity, and Freedom to Learn, in MULTILINGUAL
MATTERS (Grace P. McField ed.) (forthcoming) (arguing that the analogy between race
and language limited the Court to focusing on egregious exclusion of English language
learners akin to state-mandated segregation).
224 Moran, supra note 114, at 129-130.
225 Of course, freedom also was a significant part of the rhetoric of racial justice
used by the civil rights movement to achieve the victory in Brown and to press for its
implementation. For descriptions of freedom rides, freedom schools, and freedom
summers, see generally SANDRA ADICKEs, THE LEGACY OF A FREEDOM SCHOOL (2005);
SALLY BELFRAGE, FREEDOM SUMMER (1965); DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER 66-
115 (1988); JAMES PECK, FREEDOM RIDE 114-153 (1962); Mary Aickin Rothschild, The
Volunteers and the Freedom Schools: Education for Social Change in Mississippi, 22
HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 401 (1982); Len Holt, Freedom Schools, 9 S. EXPOSURE 42 (1981);
Daniel Perlstein, Teaching Freedom: SNCC and the Creation of the Mississippi Freedom
Schools, 30 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 297 (1990).
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no African-American, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify
as balanced, while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent
African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students would
not. It is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these results can be
viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is "broadly
diverse. ,,226
As these Justices noted, both districts modeled their voluntary plans on
desegregation precedents that presumed a binary racial world. In Louisville,
that world was either black or not; in Seattle, that world was either white or
not. Under neither plan did the school district fully account for other traits,
like language or culture, in promoting a norm of equal respect as well as the
autonomy to develop a distinct identity.
The experiences in Louisville and Seattle demonstrate that a notion of
culture-race, with its corresponding focus on freedom and flexibility, does
not fit readily into a desegregation jurisprudence that characterizes race as
either fixed and irrelevant or entrenched and stigmatizing. A narrow focus on
equality has permitted the Roberts plurality in Parents Involved to equate an
anti-classification perspective with neutral treatment. Formal equality is
dispositive, regardless of the impact on a child's freedom to learn and
prepare for life in a diverse society. At the same time, advocates of an anti-
subordination Constitution like Justice Breyer can tacitly equate this
approach with assimilation. By failing to offer a meaningful account of
diversity in the classroom, the dissent has potentially allowed the pursuit of
equality to trump the freedom to preserve distinct identities in a multiracial,
multiethnic world. Even though a majority of the Justices are now prepared
to recognize diversity as a compelling interest at the elementary and
secondary level, the stilted translation of diversity from Bakke and Grutter to
the classrooms of Louisville and Seattle is cause for concern. Any
recognition of schools as a place to build complex, flexible, and dynamic
identities has been hampered by the rigid dialectic between an anti-
classification and an anti-subordination Constitution, a dialectic that in turn
has reified race.
For those who believe that the Constitution must adapt to changing
conditions, the Court's neglect of culture-race, often achieved by pitting race
against ethnicity, is deeply troubling. Brown and the desegregation cases
looked backwards to a world largely defined as black and white in which the
color line could not easily be crossed. Bakke and the affirmative action cases
surveyed a multiracial, multiethnic landscape that complicated any notion of
a monolithic color line. Haney L6pez insists that in the face of demographic
complexity, Powell's model of ethnicity led away from race and inexorably
226 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (citations omitted).
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to reactionary colorblindness.227 Yet, this critique of Powell's approach
should not be understood as an indictment of culture-race itself. Whatever
the imperfections of the Bakke opinion, culture-race can create a positive,
autonomous space for identity-building in a world no longer organized along
oppositional, binary racial lines.
IV. THE UNEVEN MARCH TO COLORBLINDNESS: COMPARTMENTALIZED
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
A jurisprudence of fragmentation is by no means unique to education
law. Indeed, compartmentalization and inconsistency pervade equal
protection law. Each context-whether it be school desegregation,
affirmative action in higher education, government contracting, or voting
rights-permits a different tale to be told about the Court's evolving doctrine
of race and equality. In some instances, the tale is one of the march to
colorblindness, but in others it is not. Here, I want to complicate Haney
L6pez's account of Powell's turn to ethnicity as an element of civil rights
retrenchment by telling two very different tales, one about government
contracting and the other about voting rights. Although the contracting
decisions show that Powell's particular conception of ethnicity can play a
part in undoing race-conscious remedies, voting rights law demonstrates that
fluid notions of culture-race can give these remedies new life.
A. Affirmative Action and Diversity: For Academics Only
The Court has adopted distinct approaches to voluntary affirmative
action in higher education and government contracting. Shortly after Bakke
was decided, the Justices upheld a federally mandated set-aside program for
public works projects in Fullilove v. Klutznick.228 In response to changing
demographics, Congress recognized a number of disadvantaged groups,
including not only blacks but also "American Indians, Spanish-Americans,
oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts" who have "been deprived of the
opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy
because of social or economic disadvantage." 229 The bill's proponents
believed that discrimination played a key role in the low rates of minority
participation in public works projects, and congressional concern with
rectifying past wrongs became the focus of the Fullilove opinion.230 Relying
on legislative history, the Court found that the program's supporters sought
227 Haney L6pez, supra note 134, at 1034.
228 448 U.S. 448, 449 (1980) (citation omitted).
229 Id. at 464.
230 Id. at 463.
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to "direct funds into the minority business community, a sector of the
economy sorely in need of economic stimulus. ...,,231 Federal action was
necessary because "a number of factors, difficult to isolate or quantify,
seemed to impair access by minority businesses to public contracting
opportunities."
' 32
Although there were no legislative findings of intentional wrongdoing
akin to what would be required for remediation in a court of law, the
Fullilove majority accepted an inference of discrimination based on historical
and contemporary patterns of differential access to public works contracts.233
Noting Congress's special role in promoting equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applied a more relaxed standard of review
than strict scrutiny.234 As a result, Congress did not have to "act in a wholly
'color-blind' fashion '235 to redress inequality and exclusion.236 Although
some innocent non-minority firms were burdened by the set-aside, the Court
noted that the program did not seek to "confer a preferred status upon a
nondisadvantaged minority or to give special assistance to only one of
several groups established to be similarly disadvantaged minorities. 237
Instead, "Congress has not sought to give select minority groups a preferred
standing in the construction industry, but has embarked on a remedial
program to place them on a more equitable footing with respect to public
contracting opportunities. 238
Fullilove's receptivity to a program that rectified underrepresentation for
a range of groups without fine-tuned findings of comparative disadvantage
might seem consonant with Powell's approach to affirmative action in Bakke.
However, in a separate concurrence, Powell went out of his way to
distinguish the two cases. Reflecting his concerns about permanent programs
of affirmative action, he was at pains to point out that strict scrutiny applied
to all racial classifications, whether the set-asides were places in the class at
Davis medical school or awards of public works contracts.239 He made clear
that he would not approve of voluntary programs of affirmative action that
relied on set-asides except in extraordinary circumstances.
231 Id. at 459.
232 Id. at 461.
233 Id. at 477-480.
234 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472-473, 480-481.
235 Id. at 482.
236 Id. at 482-483.
237 Id. at 485.
238 Id. at 485-486.
239 Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Having observed that "[u]nlike the Regents of the University of
California, Congress properly may-and indeed must-address directly the
problems of discrimination in our society,, 240 Powell emphasized that
Congress had greater latitude to redress general patterns of unequal access
than Davis did.241 Fullilove therefore was narrowly limited because
[T]he issue here turns on the scope of congressional power, and Congress
has been given a unique constitutional role in the enforcement of the post-
Civil War Amendments. In this case, where Congress determined that
minority contractors were victims of purposeful discrimination and where
Congress chose a reasonably necessary means to effectuate its purpose, I
find no constitutional reason to invalidate [the set-aside program].242
By carefully limiting the diversity rationale in Bakke to its facts, Powell
displayed what constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein has termed a minimalist
philosophy and what Justice Scalia might refer to more caustically as
common-law, Mr. Fix-It constitutionalism. Under the minimalist approach,
judges decide "one case at a time," and they carve out compromises by
rendering decisions on grounds that "leave open the most fundamental and
difficult constitutional questions." 243 In doing so, the Justices can reach
agreement on particular results, even when confronting complex questions
like affirmative action that provoke deep and divided views on the Court and
244
among the citizenry.
Sunstein describes two key commitments of minimalism. First, decisions
should be narrow rather than wide. That is, "[t]hey decide the case at hand;
they do not decide other cases too, except to the extent that one decision
necessarily bears on other cases .... Second, the decisions are shallow
not deep; in this way, Justices can achieve consensus about concrete
outcomes, even when there is no agreement about the meaning of abstract
24 0 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).
241 Id. at 499-506 (Powell, J., concurring).
242 Id. at 516-517 (Powell, J., concurring).
243 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 5 (1999). Some scholars have criticized Sunstein's account of
minimalism as excessively vague and thus not falsifiable. However, these critiques have
used the concepts of narrowness and shallowness to give some concrete meaning to
minimalism as a method of deciding cases. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court,
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1951,
1957-1966 (2005).
244 SUNSTEIN, supra note 243, at 5; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court
1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1996); Cass
R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1733 (1995).
245 SUNSTEIN, supra note 243, at 10.
2008] 1361
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
fundamental principles like equal protection.246 In Fullilove, for instance,
Powell chose to limit his analysis to the situation confronting Congress when
it addressed problems in government contracting, and he justified the set-
aside not upon some grand, unified theory of racial justice but on special
congressional powers to rectify discrimination. Meanwhile, lest there be any
misunderstanding about the scope of his novel theory of diversity, he
confined Bakke's precedential value to the realm of higher education with its
unique history of academic freedom and dedication to the exchange of ideas.
One cost of a minimalist approach is the fragmentation that results as
cases are decided in contingent and provisional ways. The concept of culture-
race often is implicated by the Court's efforts to grapple with the relationship
between race and ethnicity, and the compartmentalization of precedents can
impede recognition of this dynamic interplay. In particular, by confining the
diversity rationale to higher education cases, the Justices can revert to reified
notions of race elsewhere in the jurisprudence of equality. This is precisely
what happened in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 24 7 By the time this
case was decided in 1989, the Court had become seriously divided about the
legitimacy of set-aside programs in government contracting. In writing for
the majority that struck down this type of program in the construction
industry, Justice O'Connor employed some of the techniques for compromise
used by her friend and mentor, Justice Powell.248
Because the Richmond City Council had adopted the plan in Croson, she
distinguished away the Fullilove precedent because it was based on
congressional powers of remediation under the Fourteenth Amendment.249
O'Connor analogized city council members in Croson to university
administrators in Bakke;250 neither group of officials had any special
competency or authority to rectify general societal discrimination. Unlike
university administrators, however, the council members could not defend
their program by drawing on a tradition of academic freedom and the need to
promote diversity. To institute a set-aside plan, city officials instead had to
identify with particularity patterns of discrimination within the
246 Id at 11-13.
247 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For the story behind the Croson case, see Reginald Oh &
Thomas Ross, Judicial Opinions as Racial Narratives: The Story of Richmond v. Croson,
in RACE LAW STORIES, supra note 15, at 381.
248 Lyle Denniston, The Center Moves, the Center Remains, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
877, 891-892 (1996); Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 56
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 6 (1999).
249 Croson, 488 U.S. at 489-491.
250 Id. at 495-497.
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municipality's jurisdiction.25' O'Connor concluded that the factual record
was insufficient to sustain the plan.252
Professor Haney L6pez argues that O'Connor deployed Powell's notion
of a "nation of minorities" in Bakke to conclude that the black majority on
the city council wielded unchecked authority and therefore could "too easily
act to the disadvantage of a [white] minority based on unwarranted
assumptions or incomplete facts., 253 In his view, by dismissing the set-aside
plan as nothing but "simple racial politics," she "followed ... Powell down
the ethnic road" yet nonetheless refused to allow the political process to
operate freely. 254 According to Haney L6pez, any genuine faith in a "nation
of minorities" would have required the Court to defer to a pluralistic political
2551h orprocess in which all groups could fairly compete. Instead, the Court
continued to apply strict scrutiny, emphasized the end of racism and the rise
of white vulnerability, and engaged in "reactionary colorblindness. 256
Although O'Connor cited Bakke to support the application of strict
scrutiny, she did not draw on the imagery of a "nation of minorities" rooted
in ethnicity to evaluate the set-aside requirement. On the contrary, she found
that Richmond remained a city rooted in binary racial politics of a black-
white nature. The set-aside provision included a range of groups, but
O'Connor pointed out that if the evidence of past discrimination was weak
with respect to blacks, it was wholly lacking with respect to "Spanish-.
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the
Richmond construction industry.... It may well be that Richmond has never
had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen. 257 The inclusion of a laundry list of
beneficiaries in turn cast doubt on the bona fides of the plan: "The random
inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have suffered
from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests that
perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.
258
What had been a virtue of inclusiveness in Fullilove became a vice of
overbreadth in Croson.
For O'Connor, Richmond was a city comprised of blacks and whites, and
the mention of other groups in the set-aside plan was mere window dressing
to camouflage the raw exercise of power. As the dominant political group,
blacks could engage in "simple racial politics" that led to stigma,
251 Id. at 491-492.
252 Id. at 505.
253 Haney L6pez, supra note 134, at 1048 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-496).
254 Id. at 1050.
255 Id. at 1063.
256 Id. at 1043, 1046-1051.
257 Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
258 Id.
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stereotyping, and overreaching. This characterization of municipal officials
suggested the kind of solidarity and oppositional politics associated with a
fear of "reverse discrimination" rather than with a "nation of minorities."
O'Connor's interpretation meant that there was no contest between race and
ethnicity in Croson; culture-race could have no place in her analysis of the
Richmond plan. In that sense, Croson looks very different from Crawford,
where Justice Powell took precisely the hands-off approach to politics that
Haney L6pez suggests is a natural outgrowth of the relativism inherent in
Bakke's conception of ethnicity.259 In assessing the validity of the statewide
ballot measure that halted court-ordered busing to remedy de facto
segregation, Powell emphasized the multiracial, multiethnic nature of the
electorate and the broad support that the proposition received among a range
of racial and ethnic groups.26° None of these features figured in O'Connor's
analysis of Croson.
One year later, the Court decided Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, which upheld a federal licensing program that
gave a plus to broadcast stations owned by minorities. 26' The Federal
Communications Commission, drawing on the Bakke rationale, justified the
policy as a way to include underrepresented groups and promote diversity on
the airwaves.262 Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan relied on
Fullilove to conclude that Congress had special powers to remedy patterns of
exclusion, so that a less stringent standard of review applied than the strict
scrutiny used in Croson.2 6' Based on the reasoning in Bakke, Brennan
concluded that broadcast diversity was, at the very least, an important First
Amendment interest that could justify the licensing program.264 Under an
intermediate level of scrutiny, the minority ownership policies passed muster
because they were substantially related to achieving this goal.265 Here, the
Court seemed once again to open the door to culture-race by recognizing that
diversity in the media can alter the quality of exchanges on the air waves.
Metro Broadcasting's effort to transplant the diversity rationale to
government contracting did not survive for long. Only five years later, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,266 the Court held that strict scrutiny
should apply to congressional set-aside programs just as it does to state and
259 Haney L6pez, supra note 134, at 1063.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 129-134.
261 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
262 Id. at 554-556.
263 Id. at 563-566.
264 Id. at 566-568.
265 Id. at 569-600.
266 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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local initiatives.267 The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, repudiated
the relaxed level of review in Metro Broadcasting as "undermin[ing]
important principles of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
established in a line of cases stretching back over 50 years., 268 Although
O'Connor went to some lengths to point out that Powell's separate
concurrence in Fullilove had presumed that strict scrutiny applied to federal
affirmative action programs, she was largely silent about his diversity
rationale in Bakke and how it fit with longstanding principles of equal
protection. Instead, she simply remanded Adarand so that a lower court could
determine whether strict scrutiny was satisfied.270 Even though Adarand did
not expressly overrule the use of diversity to justify race-conscious
contracting, this rationale largely disappeared from the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence with the exception of decisions involving higher
education.7
Why was it so difficult for diversity to find any traction as a justification
for affirmative action outside of colleges and universities? Why, in other
contexts, did the Court suspect that "simple racial politics" led to the
rigidification of race, rather than to dynamic interchange? When diversity
was used to defend the special treatment of a designated list of beneficiaries
in the broadcasting industry, the set-aside program raised the specter of a
permanent racial spoils system, the very consequence that Powell had
dreaded and strove mightily to avoid in Bakke.272 To that end, he had
carefully coupled the diversity rationale with Harvard's individualized
review policy. In effect, the narrow tailoring requirement became diversity's
tether, leading to very different results in higher education and government
contracting.
Powell saw only a limited sphere in which the Constitution could
account for the dynamism of culture-race. When quotas were used, he
thought of race as once again a reified biological irrelevancy wrongly
deployed for political ends. As a result, culture-race had little role to play
outside higher education. After all, it is hard to imagine many arenas in
which constituencies vying for recognition and rewards will be satisfied with
267 Id. at 227.
2 68 Id. at 231.
269 Id. at 235.
2 70 Id. at 237-239.
271 Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REv. 937, 944-945
(2008).
272 For a characterization of the set-aside for broadcasting licenses as a racial spoils
system, see Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 492-493
(2000).
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an amorphous promise of holistic review. Instead, interest groups seek the
sort of categorical preferences, that is, set-asides, that the Court has rejected
except when past discrimination is established. 273 Culture-race becomes an
insupportable justification because the Court fears that quota systems will
intensify racial divisions rather than create a space for the development of
racial identities. So, diversity remains the province of higher education,
where traditions of academic freedom and individual merit insulate
administrators from the most direct pressures to set aside seats.
Given the Justices' resistance to using diversity to justify other forms of
affirmative action, it is not surprising that Chief Justice Roberts could readily
dispense with Grutter by declaring it inapplicable to elementary and
secondary schools in Parents Involved.274 What is more surprising is that five
Justices, the four dissenters and Justice Kennedy, were willing to recognize
diversity as a compelling interest in the voluntary desegregation litigation.275
Although there was not much in-depth discussion on the point, these Justices
apparently believed that the learning process is not different in kind at the
elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels and that there is significant
value in creating diverse classrooms at all levels of instruction.276 By
translating the diversity rationale to the desegregation context, a majority of
the Court recognized expressive and associational aspects of the common
school, a discourse that had largely disappeared after the Rodriguez decision.
Unfortunately, however, the ongoing dialectic between the anti-classification
and anti-subordination Constitution left little room to develop a theory of
culture-race that could sustain the voluntary integration plans in Louisville
and Seattle as essential to advancing the interest in a diverse student body.
As a result, narrow tailoring became diversity's tether once again. The
dissent was willing to accept the school boards' findings that any harms
associated with voluntary desegregation plans were substantially outweighed
by the benefits of an integrated classroom, but Justice Kennedy was
unwilling to defer to these political judgments. In particular, he did not
273 See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 909 (1987) (describing a program of minority set-asides in
government contracting as likely to be the product of special-interest politics).
274 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
275 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
276 Several of the amicus briefs filed in the case went to some lengths to make this
argument based on social science evidence of the benefits of learning in a diverse student
body. See, e.g., Brief for The American Psychological Association and the Washington
State Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-22,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.
05-908, 05-915); Brief of Professors Amy Stuart Wells, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 8-29, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
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believe that Louisville and Seattle had developed systems of holistic review,
nor did he seem sanguine that busing plans ever would approximate the kind
of nuanced assessments associated with admission to Harvard's
undergraduate program or Michigan's law school.277 Faced with highly
reified notions of race in school desegregation law, Kennedy would have to
turn elsewhere for doctrinal guidance on how to create spaces that foster
identity and expression without infringing on individual rights.
B. The Uncertain March to Color-Consciousness: Voting Rights and
Justice Kennedy's Redistricting Strategies in Parents Involved
One possible source of guidance for Kennedy was the Court's voting
rights jurisprudence. As the Justices retreated from race-conscious remedies
in school desegregation, their use persisted in elections, despite similar
judicial debates over an anti-classification and an anti-subordination
Constitution. I leave for another day the complicated question of why these
two areas have evolved differently, although congressional reaffirmation of
the Voting Rights Act coupled with the Court's reluctance to overturn
legislative judgments about how to constitute the body politic clearly have
played a part.278 Voting has been characterized as a fundamental right, and
the Court's "one-person, one-vote" 27 9 mandate offers a highly individualized,
race-neutral account of equality.28 ° Yet, there is no doubt that the way votes
are aggregated plays a critical role in shaping the nature of political
representation and the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process. 2 ' The
Court has entered the thicket of redistricting only with great trepidation, and
277 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1848-1853
(1992) (noting that Congress, as part of its response, took the important step of
incorporating empirical evidence of racial polarization into the requirements for
establishing a claim of second-generation discrimination based on vote dilution due to
racial gerrymandering); Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the
Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 18-19 (2006) (describing strong
congressional reaction to the Court's narrow interpretation of Voting Rights Act
protections in a 1982 decision).
279 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 187-188 (1962) (addressing vote dilution in apportionment that led to significant
disparities in the proportion of representatives to voting populations).
280 Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1652-1653 (1993).
281 Id. at 1652-1655; Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted
Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1663, 1676-1691 (2001).
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the Justices clearly prefer bright-line rules that avoid charges of favoritism
and the anti-democratic exercise ofjudicial power.282
Advocates of an anti-classification Constitution have attacked race-
conscious redistricting as tantamount to impermissible racial
gerrymandering.283 Yet, taken to its logical conclusion, such reasoning would
imply that the dictates of the Voting Rights Act, like school desegregation
decrees, have outlived their usefulness. Presumably, the Court has been
unwilling to go this far, lest it provoke a direct confrontation with
Congress.284 Moreover, the evidentiary rules in voting rights cases offer
ongoing proof that race still matters in the electoral process. In particular,
evidence of racially polarized voting patterns-that is, that blacks choose
black candidates and whites choose white candidates-is treated not as a set
of irrelevant private preferences but as verification of the need for remedial
intervention.
In marked contrast, choices to live in segregated neighborhoods are not
deemed proof that school desegregation efforts remain imperative because of
racially polarized residential patterns. Nor are such patterns an element of
defining violations in school desegregation cases.286 Ironically, these very
different approaches to incorporating racial preferences into equal protection
law seem to reinstate the Court's purportedly discredited distinction between
political and social equality. In endorsing the doctrine of "separate but
equal." Plessy v. Ferguson treated full political participation as a
282 Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 MISS.
L.J. 271, 282-283 (1995); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1095-1096 (1991);
Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?.: Social Science and
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1520-1521 (2002).
283 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993). Later, the Court backed away
somewhat from this anti-classification approach. See Dan Tokaji, Representation and
Raceblindness: The Story of Shaw v. Reno, in RACE LAW STORIES, supra note 15, at 497,
534-539.
284 The Court may have been chastened by Congress's strong reaction to a 1980
plurality decision that required plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose in a voting
dilution case. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality). For a
description of the congressional reaction, see Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715,
747-750 (1983). The Court also retreated from a colorblind approach to redistricting a
decade later in the wake of the Shaw v. Reno decision. See Tokaji, supra note 283, at
534-539.
285 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986).
286 For a description of the unsuccessful struggle to link school and residential
segregation patterns in the Milliken litigation, see Nathaniel R. Jones, The Judicial
Betrayal of Blacks-Again: The Supreme Court's Destruction of the Hopes Raised by
Brown v. Board of Education, 32 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 109, 120-124 (2004).
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constitutionally protected value but dismissed efforts to enforce social
equality through race-mixing.287 Today, this dichotomy is subtly reinstated:
Polarized voting patterns during elections command the Court's attention as
a barrier to authentic political representation, but racialized choices about
real estate are considered a purely private, social matter outside the scope of
constitutional concern.
To deflect demands for colorblindness in the area of electoral politics,
proponents of race-conscious remedies have invoked not just historical-race
and status-race but also culture-race. Because changing patterns of voting by
racial and ethnic groups are relevant to defining a violation, these efforts
have enjoyed some success. At first, the Voting Rights Act targeted minority
exclusion and underrepresentation by eradicating racial barriers to the
individual exercise of the franchise.288 Later, however, the Act recognized
voting and representation as expressive activities, ones that not only reflect
preferences and beliefs but also shape them. The second generation of voting
rights cases therefore addressed how district lines are drawn and votes are
counted, once individuals can cast their ballots freely.289 This shift moved
from a focus on race-neutral access to the ballot box to a preoccupation with
how race influences both the quality of representation and the experience of
political participation. 290 Redistricting litigation did not treat race as a fixed
and presumptively irrelevant trait. Instead, identity-including racial
identity-was considered fluid and dynamic, the product of both structured
opportunities and individual experiences. As a result, second-generation
voting rights cases began to make room for the possibility of culture-race.
Consider, for instance, the current debates over whether the Voting
Rights Act requires majority-minority districts that establish safe seats for
minority candidates. Over the years, voting patterns have changed, so that in
some areas, thirty percent of white voters in a Democratic primary reliably
cross over to support a minority candidate. In heavily Democratic districts
with possibilities for multiracial political coalitions, a minority candidate
may have an excellent chance of winning even if minorities comprise only a
plurality of the voting population. Under these circumstances, majority-
287 The court of appeals in Milliken worried that a failure to recognize the
connections between housing patterns and school segregation in metropolitan Detroit
would raise the specter of Plessy and put Brown in peril. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d
215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
288 Guinier, supra note 282, at 1093.
289 Id. at 1093-1095.
290 Pildes, supra note 282, at 1571-1572; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 35, 39-45
(2003).
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minority districts arguably concentrate minority voters unnecessarily and
reduce the total number of representatives they can elect.291
The total number of minority officeholders is one benchmark of success
under the Voting Rights Act, but some legal scholars have moved beyond
this purely quantitative approach. In fact, sensitivity to culture-race requires a
focus on the quality of representation and how it will reflect and shape group
identity. For example, Michael Kang has argued that majority-minority
districts allow racial constituencies to confront their internal heterogeneity
and can gradually diminish presumptions that all members are best served by
voting as a block. 92 Coalitional districts, on the other hand, require the
plurality of minority voters to act as a cohesive group to ensure election of a
minority candidate. 293 The result may be coalitions that entrench the in-group
solidarity of non-whites and perpetuate their racially polarized voting
patterns, even as whites become more willing to vote across racial lines.294
Terry Smith also contends that coalitional districts alter the nature of
minority representation. 295 Because non-white officials must constantly woo
cross-over white voters, Smith argues that the representation of minority
296 n
constituents is diluted by the perennial need for compromise. If Kang and
Smith are right, coalitional districts may not be preferable to majority-
minority districts on qualitative grounds. Minorities are less free to express
their differences because they must vote as a racial block, while white voters
retain flexible identities that allow them to cross over or not, depending on
the candidate.
Until 2007, when the Court decided LULAC v. Perry,297 Justice Kennedy
had largely ignored questions of culture-race in voting rights cases.298 In
L ULA C, Kennedy voted to strike down a redistricting plan because it diluted
the Latino vote.299 In reaching this conclusion, he acknowledged both the
changing political identity and internal heterogeneity of Latinos in Texas. 300
Kennedy first noted that some Latinos were mobilizing to unseat a Latino
291 Pildes, supra note 282, at 1529-1539.
292 Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 781-
787 (2008).
293 Id. at 797-800.
294 Id. at 798.
295 Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 261, 294 (2005).
296 Id. at 293.
297 LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
298 Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Comment: Justice Kennedy
and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (2007).
299 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427-435.
300 Id. at 432-435.
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incumbent because of increasing dissatisfaction with his representation.01
Kennedy did not want redistricting to reify the Latino vote by presuming that
a Latino incumbent automatically served Latino interests, particularly when
the evidence was strongly to the contrary.30 2 Kennedy also observed that the
newly created district, designed to protect the incumbent, lumped together
Latinos with very different interests and concerns.0 3
Kennedy was convinced that Latinos living near the border were
politically distinct from those living in Austin, a state capital several hundred
miles north.304 He rejected a redistricting plan that bleached out these
differences by treating Latinos as a homogeneous constituency. 305 He also
expressed dismay that just as Latinos in the southern part of the state were
poised to exercise their political clout, they were thwarted by the redrawing
of district lines.306 He feared that redistricting was being used to deter
political expression and participation of an emboldened and emerging
constituency. 307 For all of these reasons, he found a violation of the Voting
Rights Act.308
Elsewhere, Heather Gerken has argued that LULAC influenced
Kennedy's decision in Parents Involved.30 9 He did seem to have Texas on his
mind, having cited Bush v. Vera,310 another voting rights lawsuit from the
Lone Star State, to support the application of strict scrutiny to voluntary
school desegregation. 3t' But his preoccupation did not end there. In LULAC,
Kennedy relied on First Amendment freedoms of association and expression
to countenance race-conscious decision-making that was respectful of racial
difference but did not succumb to stereotypes about a monolithic Latino
identity.312
301 Id. at 423-424, 440-441.
302 Id. at 428-429.
303 Id. at 428-429, 435.
304 Id. at 424, 434-435.
305 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 438-439.
308 Id. at 435, 442.
309 Gerken, supra note 298, at 105-107. In an article published before the Parents
Involved decision, Professor Goodwin Liu argued that the redistricting cases were more
relevant than affirmative action cases in the Louisville and Seattle litigation and that the
Court's voting rights jurisprudence supported the use of race-conscious student
assignment plans. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 301-307
(2007). Justice Kennedy clearly took a different view of the narrow tailoring issue.
310 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
311 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (2007).
3 12 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435, 438-442.
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In Parents Involved, Kennedy also was receptive to race-consciousness
in the structuring of opportunities to participate, this time in public
schools. 13 Kennedy wanted school boards to be able to build common
schools by fostering diversity and reducing racial isolation. In doing so,
Kennedy "not only acknowledge[d] race's associational and expressive
dimensions, but show[ed] some awareness of the relationship between the
two-the possibility that the choices the state makes in grouping individuals
will affect the choices individuals make in expressing their identity. 31 4
Kennedy seemed especially concerned that interracial tolerance and
understanding would be difficult to learn in segregated environments,
whether they were the product of state action or private residential choices.315
Drawing on his experience with crafting remedies for electoral wrongs,
Kennedy embraced race-neutral treatment of individuals, just as the first
generation of voting rights cases did. For this reason, he rejected the student
assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville. At the same time, though,
Kennedy endorsed the legitimacy of race-consciousness in structuring
opportunities to participate, just as the second-generation vote dilution
decisions did. To that end, he allowed race to be a factor in aggregating
children when school boards draw attendance boundaries or choose sites for
new schools.3 16
Whether a strategy modeled on voting rights will work for voluntary
school desegregation remains to be seen. For most voters, the boundaries of
an electoral district are an abstraction encountered once a year. But the
boundaries of a neighborhood are part of a concrete, lived experience.
Residential areas become sites of ordinary, everyday practices that define and
entrench the cultural identifications associated with race. Segregated
neighborhoods figure among the most profound spaces in which culture-race
is made, even if school desegregation cases have treated them as largely
beyond the law's reach.317 It seems unlikely that an occasional school siting
or redistricting decision will disrupt deeply rooted patterns of residential
segregation, particularly when decades of court-ordered desegregation
remedies have not. Indeed, one recent, albeit controversial, study suggests
313 Gerken, supra note 298, at 112-117.
314 Id. at 120.
3 15 Id. at 115-116.
316 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
3 17 MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 97-101
(1990) (describing the role of residential segregation in creating ethnic neighborhoods
that influence individual identity); see also CHARLES TILLY, IDENTITIES, BOUNDARIES,
AND SOCIAL TIES 213-214 (2005) (describing the role of cultural ecology in identity
politics); KlAN TAJBAKHSH, THE PROMISE OF THE CITY: SPACE, IDENTITY, AND POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THOUGHT 179 (2001) (noting that social differentiation and
juridical boundaries "organize some identities in, and some out").
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that even in residential areas that are diverse, interchange and cooperation
across racial and ethnic lines will not take place without affirmative efforts to
build a common experience of community.318
Regardless of whether Kennedy's strategy succeeds, however, his
opinion has served the valuable function of reintroducing the concept of
culture-race into the school desegregation arena. In doing so, he shows that
despite Haney L6pez's grim prognosis regarding Justice Powell's ethnicity
turn, a focus on culture-race need not lead to reactionary colorblindness or
even to judicial laissez-faire. In fact, recognizing culture-race offers a
potential way out of the gridlock associated with endless debates over the
anti-classification and anti-subordination Constitution. By acknowledging the
ways in which group identity is fluid and flexible, the Court can begin to
consider how public spaces should be structured to promote freedom of
expression and association on terms of equality, civility, and respect.31 9
CONCLUSION
The Parents Involved decision starkly reveals the limitations of a
jurisprudence of fragmentation. The Court's desegregation doctrine has been
hamstrung by a longstanding battle over whether Brown enshrines a
Constitution dedicated to enforcing formal equality or to eradicating racial
stratification. Bakke and Grutter employ a different logic, one that treats
diversity as a means to promote identity-formation, personal expression, and
interpersonal knowledge. Under this rationale, race is not a rigid absolute but
a culturally inflected, contextual trait. Because of the distinct logics
underlying the desegregation and affirmative action cases, however diversity
could not be readily translated to an arena that has long treated race as either
a biological irrelevancy or a marker of inequality.
Only Justice Kennedy made some room for a different approach to race-
at least at the margins of school board decision-making. What remains to be
seen is whether a recognition of culture-race can restore the full promise of
Brown's legacy by demonstrating that race is not simply a product of biology
or history over which we have no control. Instead, race is a fluid trait
integrally shaped by the choices we make today. Parents Involved, by
overturning voluntary integration plans, has taken us further down a path of
318 Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-
first Century: The 2006 John Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCAND. POL. STUD. 137, 146-151,
164-165 (2007).
3 19 See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONsTrrUTION 213-216 (1989); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 122-127; Kenneth
L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, supra note 111, at
303,340-357,361-377.
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racial reification and rigidity. Yet, even a fleeting glimpse of a more dynamic
vision of race reminds us that we can and must do better.
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